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Abstract
The partnership between medical academia and the pharmaceutical industry has been
scrutinized for issues associated with research bias. As a result of this scrutiny, the Institute of
Medicine (IOM) issued policy recommendations in 2009 directing academia to adopt
comprehensive conflict of interest (COI) policies. During the same time, a slowdown of
funded research into academia occurred, and it is not clear whether the IOM
recommendations contributed to this problem. The purpose of this case study was to
determine the extent to which compliance with the IOM policy resulted in a reduction in
funded research. The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) was the theoretical lens used for
study. COI policy statements (n = 15) were analyzed from American Association of Medical
Colleges member schools that engage in medical research. In addition, in-depth interviews
were conducted with 4 medical academic researchers. Data were inductively coded and
organized around key themes. Key findings indicated that medical academia is compliant with
IOM recommendations and COI policies did not appear to have a direct effect on research
placement by industry. Interestingly, a possible explanation for reductions in industry funding
relate to inefficient institutional review board processes. Additionally, the ACF construct was
validated via an observed complex and slowly evolving COI policy process. The positive
social change implications of this study include recommendations to academia to continue to
monitor and report on COI and explore efficiency improvements related to IRB oversight in
order to support important pharmaceutical research that ultimately improves the health and
wellbeing of people.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
During the 20th century, significant research and collaborative projects ranging
from molecule discovery and development, Phase 1 through 4 clinical trials, and
investigator initiated research typified the working partnership between medical
academic institutions and the pharmaceutical industry (Brody, 2011a; Furman &
MacGarvie, 2009; Maahs, 2012). Pharmaceutical industry backed research comprised of
approximately one-third of all research support at United States based medical academic
centers ranging from $27.1 to $38.4 billion annually (Dorsey et al., 2010) and has
involved tens of thousands of patients on an annual basis (Maahs, 2012).
This relationship between academia and industry has come under close scrutiny
during the last 20 years due to public concerns over undue influence, research bias, and
conflicts of interest (Brody 2010; Insel, 2010; Maahs, 2012; Mansi et al., 2012; Roseman
et al., 2011; Wynia & Boren, 2009). Calls have been made by both the government and
the medical community for policy reform and the establishment of restrictive interaction
and COI policies (Breenan et al., 2006; Maahs, 2012; Rothman & Chimonas, 2008;
Steinbrook, 2009) has further shifted this relationship from collaborative (open) to
noncollaborative (restrictive) in nature. Consequently, the medical academic community
has seen a slowdown in the quantity of research funding placed by the pharmaceutical
industry during the last 10 years (Dorsey et al., 2010; Maahs, 2012).
Dorsey et al. (2010) found that when adjusted for inflation, the annual growth rate
of pharmaceutical research placement to the medical academic centers decreased
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statistically significantly from 8% during 1994 to 2003 to 6% for 2003 to 2007 (p < .05).
It is important to note that these funding levels occurred before the global recession from
2007 to 2009. Dorsey et al. (2010) also reported that the number of new Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) medication approvals annually from 1998 to 2002 (𝑥𝑥̅ = 21) and
2003 to 2008 (𝑥𝑥̅ = 20) was flat, and pharmaceutical industry backed research comprised
approximately one-third of all research support at United States based medical academic
centers ranging from $27.1 to $38.4 billion annually.
The extent to which noncollaborative interaction and COI policies has been
related to these decreased funding levels is unknown, is a problem, and, therefore,
requires further investigation (Maahs, 2012) and provides a scholarly justification for this
scientifically based qualitative research. The potential social implication of decreased
medical research as a result of a more noncollaborative environment between academic
medical institutions and the pharmaceutical industry is profound. The unintended
consequence of such policies could result in a slowdown of new medicine development
and disease management and/or prevention. From a social justice perspective, this could
imply an unexpected delay in the development of life-saving medications and a dramatic
impact on world health.
In Chapter 1, I provide an overview of the research problem and methodology, the
conceptual framework employed, and a discussion of the existing and growing strained
relationship between the pharmaceutical industry and the medical academic community
during the last 6 years. In Chapter 1, I also introduce the corresponding development of
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restrictive interaction policies adopted by academia and the slowdown of research
placement by the pharmaceutical industry into academic medical institutions.
Background
The medical profession and the pharmaceutical industry enjoyed an open and
unrestricted working relationship during the 20th century (Brody, 2011a; Furman &
MacGarvie, 2009). This relationship ranged from research conducted involving molecule
discovery and development to all four phases of FDA monitored research. These four
phases of FDA research are described as follows;
•

Phase 1: New medication treatment on low census of humans to determine overall
safety, dosage range, and side effects.

•

Phase 2: New medication treatment to larger census of humans to determine
effectiveness and further determination on safety.

•

Phase 3: New medication treatment on even larger census of humans to reaffirm
effectiveness, collect further safety data, track side effects, and compare it placebo
or other commonly used treatments. A double blind placebo study is common in
Phase 3 research projects.

•

Phase 4: Research done on human patients after a medication has been approved
(post marketing trials) to gather information on medication effect on various
populations and side effects with regard to long term use.
During the 20th century, significant new medication development was fostered

through collaborative partnerships between the medical academic community and
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pharmaceutical companies involving all four phases of FDA monitored research (Maahs,
2012). Furman and MacGarvie (2009) examined the rapid development of new
medications and the corresponding statistically significant positively correlated growth (n
= 102, r = 0.21, p < .05) of the pharmaceutical industry and found that firms that
engaged with universities had higher rates of new medication development and
laboratory growth than those that did not engage partnerships with academia. This
collaboration typically took the form of pharmaceutical industry funded medication
research trials conducted independently by the medical academic community. Funded
research varied from very open study designs and control by the research university to
very tightly controlled where an academic institution was provided exact parameters of
the research to be completed to include complete study design, methodology, and data
analysis.
During the last 2 decades, these research partnerships, as well as the entire
framework of interactions between the medical academic community and the
pharmaceutical industry, have come under intense criticism and scrutiny. One of the
central issues concerning this debate is the issue of influence and bias (Maahs, 2012).
Angell (2008) contented that prior to the 1980s, more free-form pharmaceutical research
grants to academic centers gave the principal investigators (PIs) primary control over the
research process, whereas now this control has shifted, typically involving the sponsoring
companies providing an entire template covering all aspects of the research directing the
academic research process and sometimes even suggesting the outcome (dependent

5
variables). This involved elements including setting the research questions, the research
methodology, the study purpose and design, sample size and the population to which the
findings would be generalizable, selection of testing instruments, reporting of side
effects, and statistical analysis. The control of this process created concerns that the
pharmaceutical industry was attempting to create research with the intended outcome
preprescribed by the funding entity. The defense of this process can also be explained
that when doing large medication studies across multiple sites and institutions, the
research design, methodology, and analysis must be mirrored across all locations or the
entire study would be invalid due to replicability issues.
Currently, limited scientifically based and scholarly research exists to report the
nature of the interaction between the pharmaceutical industry and medical professionals
within the academic community. A random survey of 3,080 medical academic
researchers, where 17% were identified as PIs (and fellow and hospital staff medical
providers were excluded), found that 53% of the respondents had some form of
interaction or relationship with the pharmaceutical industry (Zinner, Bolcic-Jankovic,
Clarridge, Blumenthal, & Campbell, 2009). Campbell et al. (2007) conducted a 2006
survey of department chairs at 125 medical schools and 15 large teaching hospitals and
reported a slightly higher level of interaction with close to 60% of academic medical
department chairs reporting some form of paid industry contact or relationship including
being on a consultancy or advisory board, being a part of a compensated speaker bureau,
being a board of director member, or being a company officer.
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These questionable financial relationships between medical professionals and the
pharmaceutical industry have called into question the entire concept of COI (Campbell et
al., 2007; Maahs, 2012; Zinner et al., 2009). The prevailing thought process of those
inherent in such relationships is that this potentially creates ethical dilemmas for medical
professionals relative to patient care and safety and their respective pharmaceutical
industry involvement (Brody, 2011a; Maahs, 2012). Numerous calls for reform and
regulation on this topic have become more prevalent during the last decade. From 2001 to
2008, at least 16 prominent reports (Steinbrook, 2009) have called for reform and policy
development with respect to interaction and COI medical academia and industry.
Brennan et al. (2006) created a turning point with regard to the entire topic of
interaction and COI at the medical professional level. This particular article (Brennan et
al., 2006) was the result of a task force appointed by the American Board of Internal
Medicine Foundation (ABIMF) and the Institute on Medicine as a Profession (IOMAP)
in 2004, and the authors found that existing policy and guidelines on industry interaction
was minimal and not well defined. Recommendations by this task force (the ABIMF and
IOMAP) in 2006 called for widespread reforms in medical academia including restricting
pharmaceutical industry representatives’ access to physicians, restrictions on medication
samples, prohibiting involvement in pharmaceutical speaker bureaus, and developing
institutional level COI policies (Brennan et al., 2006; Maahs, 2012).
By 2008, at least 25 public and private medical academic institutions including
Yale University, University of Massachusetts, Boston University, University of
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Pittsburgh, University of Pennsylvania, University of Chicago, University of Michigan,
University of Wisconsin, and the entire University of California medical school system
voluntarily adopted comprehensive COI policies (Rothman & Chimonas, 2008). A
February 2009 report issued by the AAMC called on all major research universities to
adopt comprehensive COI policies within 2 years. The policy recommendations from the
AAMC were consistent with the Breenan et al. (2006) policy recommendations and
further sought to ban all pharmaceutical representatives from academic campuses as well
as prohibit any industry provided food as it would be considered a “gift” and fall under
the zero-dollar gifting giving provision.
Following the 2009 policy recommendations by the AAMC, the NIH, National
Research Council (NRC), National Academy of Sciences (NAS), and the IOM all
weighed in on COI across the entire spectrum of medicine. In April 2009, with partial
funding provided by the NIH, the IOM with an endorsement from the NRC and the NAS
issued its nationwide report on COI in medical research education and practice (Lo &
Field, 2009). The IOM defined COI as a set of circumstances that created a risk that
professional judgment or actions might be unduly influenced by a secondary financial
interest (Lo & Field, 2009). The IOM called for all public and private institutions
engaged in medical research and education to adopt policies across an entire range of
interaction, medical samples, continuing medical education activities, speaker bureau
involvement, and consulting contracts that pertain to medical providers and industry (Lo
& Field, 2009).
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Problem Statement
During the 20th century, productive and collaborative working relationships
existed between United States based medical academic institutions and the
pharmaceutical industry. These collaborative relationships have been credited for
significant medical advancements as a result of collaborative research projects (Brody,
2011a; Furman & MacGarvie, 2009; Maahs, 2012). Concerns about undue influence and
integrity of academic research led to calls for policy reform at the public and private
medical institutional level (AAMC, 2009; Breenan et al., 2006; Lo & Field, 2009). The
working relationships between these entities have become more noncollaborative in
nature as the policy recommendations set forth in the 2009 IOM report were adopted at
the individual institution level (Gozalez-Campoy, 2009; Huddle, 2010). It is not known,
however, exactly how compliant all medical academic institutions have been with
enacting COI policies and how similar their policies are to the 2009 IOM’s
recommendations.
The slowdown of funding collaborative research projects by the pharmaceutical
industry to medical academic centers in the United States from 2003 to 2007 (Dorsey et
al., 2010) came during a time typified by industry-academia scrutiny and the call for
restrictive interaction and COI policies (Maahs, 2012; Steinbrook, 2009). It has also been
reported that from 2003 to 2008, the number of new FDA approved medications has been
relatively flat (Steinbrook, 2009), raising concerns relative to research effectiveness and
efficiency. This creates a gap in the current literature and is a problem because it may be
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an unintended consequence of adopting noncollaborative policies between academia and
industry and potentially has already stifled medical advancement.
Purpose of Study
In a qualitative manner, I intended to study 10 academic medical institutions and
the extent to which these academic medical institutions have adopted interaction and COI
policies governing their healthcare professionals’ interface with the pharmaceutical
industry from 2007 through 2014 and in line with the 2009 IOM recommendations. The
timeline that was studied is important to understand within the context of the COI
policies that were nonexistent or not well defined prior to a call for action by Breenan et
al. (2006) and the corresponding evolution and compliance of these policies post 2009
IOM recommendations through 2014. Additionally, this qualitative study was designed to
determine the nature of the relationships between pharmaceutical firms and medical
academic institutions when a financial arrangement exists. The qualitative study was
intended to more fully understand the rationale and decision making process of medical
academic institutions (and the pharmaceutical funding implications) when developing
interaction and COI policies, whether mandated or not. Finally, implications for social
change were examined with regard to patient safety and medicine development in light of
the revisions to policies.
The purpose of this qualitative research study was to genuinely understand the
evolution and current relationship that exists between medical academic institutions and
the pharmaceutical industry. It should be noted that the purpose of this research was not
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intended to show that noncollaborative medical academic institutions were negatively
impacted by research placement and that collaborative institutions were positively
impacted by research placement. The purpose of this research was also not intended to
call for a reversal of COI policy and drive an argument for the return in the way in which
these entities interacted in the late 1990s through early 2000s.
Research Questions
Qualitative Research Question 1: Since the release of the IOM Policy Report (Lo
& Field, 2009), to what extent have interaction and COI policies been fully complied
with by United States based medical academic institutions, what were the rationale(s) and
decision making considerations involved in developing such policies, and how would
these institutions classify the current nature of their relationship with pharmaceutical
companies as opposed to pre 2009?
Qualitative Research Question 2: What are some of the effects that new COI
policies have had on pharmaceutical industry research funding for United States based
medical academic institutions since the implementation of the IOM Report (Lo & Field,
2009)?
Conceptual Framework
As qualitative researchers develop their methods of inquiry, they bring their own
sets of beliefs and assumptions, as well as their worldviews, about the environment
around them. These paradigms or worldviews as discussed by Creswell (2007) helped to
shape the processes and practices that researchers undertake. I have been in the
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pharmaceutical industry since 2003 and currently am employed by Pfizer as a hospital
sales representative. I have observed first-hand the implementation of the new 2009 IOM
recommendations on COI policies and the corresponding changes in the working
relationships between academia and industry. It is through this lens that I am able to bring
the insights from my professional experience to this qualitative research study. I have an
ethical responsibility to be objective and control my own personal bias on the topic. I
mention this throughout the study and my attempts to be bias free. I have made the proper
financial disclosures in Appendix A of this dissertation.
The conceptual framework ACF was initially developed by Sabatier and JenkinsSmith during the late 1980s to the early 1990s to understand coalition behavior and
structure, the influence of science and information technology on policy development,
and the role of contentious policy subsystems on policy change and behavior (Birkland,
2001; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1988). Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1988) presented that
ACF is based on five premises: (a) technology and science based information plays a
central role in the policy process, (b) a minimum of 10 years is needed to fully
understand policy change, (c) vested parties are expanded beyond traditional players to
include multiple parties (all levels of government, media, consultants, and scientists), (d)
enacted policies and programs are a reflection of beliefs, and (e) the policy subsystem
itself can be measured by policy topic, geographic scope, and stakeholders. Within these
premises, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith submitted that decision making, whether by the
individual or institution, was based on a heuristic decision making platform as opposed to
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more rational one. This conceptual framework has been applied worldwide across a wide
array of policy topics including medical education and drug policy (University Colorado
– Denver, 2013). Particular to policy development itself, one can observe multiple parties
exercising their own opinions based on their own individual experiences, and the end
result is policy that while intended to protect patient safety may actually stifle medical
advancement.
The two qualitative research questions investigated dealt with interaction and COI
policy development by the medical academic community and the nature of its
relationship with research funding placement by the pharmaceutical industry in these
same medical institutions (Maahs, 2012). Concepts around the ACF were used to develop
the lens that informed and guided the research process; that is, the beliefs and actions of
several subsystems were observed during research question development and study
design. Combined with the contentious nature of the overall topic, it can be argued that
using ACF as the conceptual framework was a good fit for this dissertation because
multiple stakeholders across many levels of government, the medical community
(institutional and individual), the pharmaceutical industry, and the media have all been
involved in the discussion and evolution of COI policy development.
Nature of the Study
The initial research design was qualitative in nature, included an open-ended
online survey, and incorporated an interview element of 10 nationally representative
institutions that voluntarily agreed to be a part of the interview phase of the research (n =
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10). The research approach was to arrive at 10 institutions total that fully participated in
both the survey and the interview portion of the study. An internet records review of COI
policy was employed to verify and answer portions of the research questions. An
invitation to participate in research with an open-ended online survey and voluntary
follow-up interview was sent to the medical directors of the 75 medical academic
institutions affiliated with the AAMC that conduct medical research to solicit information
about interaction and COI policy and research funding received by the pharmaceutical
industry from 2007 through 2014. My intention was to capture information about the
evolution of institutional policy development pre- and post-2009 IOM recommendations
on COI, institutional research funding trends from the pharmaceutical industry, and the
rationale and decision making process relative to institutional COI policy development.
Being qualitative in nature, data collected were examined and analyzed across a wide
array of circumstances and categories. This included and was not limited to how similar
an institution’s actual COI policy was to the 2009 IOM recommendations, based on the
responses given (Lo & Field, 2009), public versus private institution policy development,
research funding trends at individual institution level and association of similarity to 2009
IOM recommendations, similarity of institution motivation, concern, and decision
making process relative to policy development and enactment.
Operational Definitions
Certified medical education (CME): The medical industry term pertaining to
continuing education credits earned by healthcare professionals required to maintain an
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active medical license (Shi & Singh, 2008). Determined by individual state, physicians
are required to complete between 12 to 50 hours of CME on an annual basis (Advanced
Health Care Media, 2013).
Collaborative institution: Term developed by medical researchers to identify an
academic institution that allows open access and interaction between its healthcare
professionals and the pharmaceutical industry. This includes allowing staff to engage in
compensated activities to include researcher, advisory board member, or speaker bureau
member. Healthcare providers are typically compensated via grant and/or consultant
contract and are usually required to disclose such financial arrangements with their
respective academic institution. Additionally, these financial arrangements are to be
reported by the pharmaceutical industry as required by Physician Payment Sunshine Act
(PPSA) of 2010 (American Medical News, 2013) by 2014.
Collaborative research: Common medical industry term describing joint research
funded by the pharmaceutical industry and conducted by medical academic institutions;
concept describing a process by which both parties (industry and academic) engage in
research from a shared common goal of advancing human science (Hughes, 2008; Kitsis,
2011).
Conflict of interest (COI): Common medical industry term describing when a
healthcare provider’s or medical researcher's motives are and/or an appearance of the
same are placed in a situation where the moral decision making process with regard to
patient care and safety could be compromised by personal gain, association with the
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pharmaceutical industry, or being influenced by marketing and promotion practices
(AAMC, 2009; Brennan et al., 2006; Lo & Field, 2009). Application of COI primarily
defined by individual institution in the form of its’ own respective COI policy.
Contract medical organization (CMO): Scientific medical industry term
pertaining to a private organization that exists to perform medical research on an
independent third-party and contracted basis for the pharmaceutical industry, with no
vested interest implied in the findings (Abodor, 2010).
Disclosure: Common medical industry term pertaining to the reporting of
financial arrangements between healthcare professionals and the pharmaceutical industry
including practices as compensated researcher, speaker bureau, or advisory board
member (Rothman & Chimonas, 2008). Typically covered under institutional COI
policies, physicians who engage in such activities are required to report these financial
arrangements with their respective institutions. Under the provisions of the PPSA of 2010
(American Medical News, 2013), pharmaceutical companies will be required to report
such arrangements via a publicly available searchable database beginning in 2014.
Healthcare professional: Common medical industry term referring to an
individual who is licensed to prescribe medications and includes medical doctors, nurse
practitioners, and physician assistants (Baker & Baker, 2011).
Interaction policy: Common medical industry term referring to policies developed
by medical academic institutions to govern their respective healthcare professionals
contact and association with the pharmaceutical industry (Brennan et al., 2006).
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Medical academic institution: Common medical industry term referring to an
organization that performs functions involved with medical research and/or education as
well as patient treatment and care (Baker & Baker, 2011).
Noncollaborative institution: Term developed by me to identify a medical
academic institution that restricts access to and interactions between its healthcare
professionals and the pharmaceutical industry. This includes prohibiting such
compensated activities as independent researcher, advisory board member, or speaker
bureau member (Maahs, 2012).
Research bias: Common academic and medical industry term describing a
process where the individual researcher’s decision making with regard to research
questions, methodology, design, sampling, conduct, analysis, interpretation, and
presentation may be affected intentionally or unintentionally by preference or COI
(Creswell, 2007; Sismondo, 2007) or the appearance of COI.
Transparency: Common medical industry term referring to the practice of
healthcare professionals and medical academic institutions reporting payments from
industry; pharmaceutical industry publicly disclosing its compensation, commercial
support, and research support to healthcare professionals, medical academic institutions,
and healthcare professional associations (Brody, 2005, 2006).
Undue influence: Common language that will be used in this study describing the
potential effect of the pharmaceutical industry employing various interaction, marketing,
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and promotional practices that might influence physician research or prescription
behavior to the benefit of the pharmaceutical industry (Sismondo, 2007).
Assumptions
1. Institutions that comprised the sample (n = 10) and replied to the qualitative
open-ended survey and participated in the interview were representative of the
75 medical schools in the United States engaged in medical research. That is,
whether an institution has enacted collaborative or noncollaborative policies, a
representative distribution of these types of institutions replied and therefore
were representative of medical academic institutions as a whole. A desired
sample size of at least 20 institutions for the survey and 10 institutions that
would have completed the survey and volunteered for the interview portion of
the study would have been preferred.
2. Survey and interview responses were consistent with institutional attitudes
and beliefs. Surveys and interviews were addressed to the medical director of
the 75 institutions initially selected for this qualitative study. Every attempt
was made to interview an administrator with decision making authority with
regard to COI policy from 10 institutions. While responses were being
prepared by individuals within an institution, the answers provided were
assumed to be representative of the institution itself.
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3.

The survey was written in an objective manner and therefore was not
“leading” the respondent to answer in a manner inconsistent with his or her
own institution’s beliefs.
Scope and Delimitations

1. The scope of this qualitative study included the 75 publicly and privately
funded medical academic centers in the United States that were currently
members of the AAMC and conducted medical research at a teaching
institution. The AAMC included 141 accredited member schools from the
United States and Canada (AAMC, 2011) with not all institutions engaged in
medical research.
2. The definition of a collaborative or noncollaborative institution evolved
through the data collection and analysis phase. The assignment of an
institution as collaborative or noncollaborative was not preassigned but coded
emergently. Analysis of COI policies and the interview portion of the research
study research provided patterns, themes, and associations eventually defined
as collaborative or noncollaborative in relative terms. That is, my analysis of
the data helped to determine if an institution was more or less collaborative in
nature as opposed to an absolute assignment.
3. Research funding placement was limited only to research grants awarded at
the institutional level by the pharmaceutical industry from 2007 to 2014.
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Study Limitations
This qualitative study had several design and methodological weaknesses. The
first concern was whether or not noncollaborative policies on interaction and COI at the
institution level had a relationship to research funding placement. That is, medical
academic centers that could have made a deliberate decision to no longer be involved in
pharmaceutical funded research and restrictive policies enacted after the fact were
reflected only as a by-product of that decision (Maahs, 2012). The interview portion of
the research study included questions asking institutions to identify issues like this.
Another limitation involved long term research grants that may have come to an end or
were just initiated during the years examined in this study. For example, a 5 year study
may have come to an end that was not intended to be renewed at the same time a
restrictive policy was put in place. Without knowing this, one could make the assumption
that research funding was reduced due to restrictive policies where in fact it was merely a
timing issue of research coming to an end (Maahs, 2012). Again, this was accounted for
by asking open-ended and follow-up questions to solicit this type of information from
study participants through member checking.
The first portion of this study using survey based information gathering could
have be problematic if a low response rate had occurred. Ten institutions were the
proposed sample size for completion of the survey and subsequent interview phase of the
research. The quality and relevance of this study was dependent upon having enough data
to be coded and to analyze emergent patterns or themes from the institutions responding
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through the use of emergent coding and saturated data. One way to address a potential
low survey response issue was to collect information already available publicly and cross
check it through the online surveys. Many public medical academic centers are upfront in
their reporting of interaction and COI policies. For instance, the University of Wisconsin
Health website has a link that directly provides its policy on interactions with industry
concerns (UW Health, 2012). Whether the information required for this qualitative study
was compiled via open-ended survey and/or semistructured interview and/or already
publicly disclosed information, the data were available to adequately answer the research
questions. However, the quantity and quality of information to be gathered presented
numerous challenges, and, as a result, the study was modified to elicit additional
meaningful data via recorded interviews and online policy reviews. I discuss this further
in Chapter 4.
Significance
The significance of this qualitative study potentially applies at many different
levels. The study was conducted during a time when the United States economy was
struggling and the placement of pharmaceutical research was gravitating away from the
university level to contract research organizations abroad (Maahs, 2012). Many of the
medical advancements that have occurred in the last 40 years have been made possible
through a mechanism of open collaboration between the private sector and the university
setting. The inherent value of this research calls for a fair, balanced, and transparent
approach to this working relationship moving forward. While an industry-academia
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relationship with no parameters or guidelines in place would potentially create COI
issues, overly restrictive policies can also stifle medical advancements that would
otherwise only come about because of collaboration. The implication for overall change
would be for a call for interaction policies that foster collaboration yet are open and
transparent enough to reasonably address COI concerns (Maahs, 2012).
From a social change perspective, medical advancement and patient safety
concerns could be more adequately addressed through collaborative partnerships as
opposed to noncollaborative ones. It can be argued that more positive and symbiotic
relationships between the pharmaceutical industry and the medical academic community
might allow this. This more collaborative platform entertains the possibility of getting
new medicines to the world in a faster and more efficient manner through the mechanism
of reputable United States based and FDA desirable research produced at medical
academic centers.
Summary
The working relationship between the pharmaceutical industry and medical
academic institutions was reported to be more restrictive and less collaborative in the last
5 to 10 years. Concerns about research bias, undue influence, and COI have facilitated a
call for reform with regard to this relationship between academia and industry. Policy
development by medical academic institutions attempted to account for these issues
through the enactment of interaction and COI policies. While generally observed that
policies have been adopted at the institutional level, it is unknown to what extent such
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policies would be consistent with 2009 guidelines from the IOM concerning COI.
Additionally, it was unknown, from a monitoring, enforcement, and disclosure
standpoint, if such policies are effective. It has been observed that research funding to
medical institutions by the pharmaceutical industry has slowed during the last 10 years
(Dorsey et al., 2010; Maahs, 2012). Further, the nature of the relationship between
pharmaceutical funding at medical institutions and their stated interaction and COI
policies is unknown. Thus, this qualitative and exploratory study attempted to address
these issues. In Chapter 2, I provide a review of the pertinent literature with regard to the
evolution of interaction and COI policies adopted by medical academic institutions. I
present a qualitative research design, methodology, data collection and analysis
instruments used for this study in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, I provide the results from a
qualitative and data rich analysis of actual current COI policies from (n = 15) AAMC
institutions and interviews from (n = 4) administrators from those respective school. I
present recommendations to industry and academia about embracing a more efficient
research and collaboration platform for the purpose of developing new medicines for the
benefit of humankind in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
Literature research was completed using a number of different of sources and
search strategies. A very macro-oriented approach was started using Google and Google
Scholar and then funneled down using more specific and scientific databases including
Medline, Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health Literature (CINAHL), and
Science Citation Index Expanded. Google and Google Scholar were used employing
general search terms medical school or medical institution, along with pharmaceutical
industry or pharmaceutical company as the root for all inquiries. Additional search words
and phrases, including research funding placement, conflict of interest, interaction with
industry, research bias, conflict of interest policy, collaboration, and contract medical
organizations were all used in various combinations with root phrases. Research
references from Google produced usable news articles with regard to historical and recent
developments concerning the general topic. Google Scholar provided scholarly and
professional research content from a peer-reviewed journal article perspective ranging
from Journal of the American Medical Association, British Medical Journal, and New
England Journal of Medicine to the American Journal of Bioethics, Journal of Business
Chemistry, and the Journal of Business Ethics. The total number of usable and useful
peer-reviewed journal references cited in this dissertation was approximately 30 articles.
The next search strategy employed resources available through the Walden University
Library via various online search databases. The database search engines included

24
Medline, CINAHL, and Science Citation Index Expanded. Search inquiries used the root
term pharmaceutical industry, with additional search terms conflict of interest,
interaction, collaboration, bias, or contract research. This search strategy had a
duplicative effect of about 70% of the Google searches and produced around 20
additional citable references. This particular search strategy produced peer reviewed
journal articles consistent with Google search, and additional cited references came from
the Journal of Law Medicine & Ethics, Nature Reviews: Drug Discovery, Clinical
Pharmacology & Therapies, Mayo Clinic Proceedings, and Pain Medicine.
The final search strategy used Academic Search Complete and ProQuest Central
databases using the same search strategy detailed above. Using the same generic search
terms produced a high rate of duplication of previous articles found. Approximately five
peer-reviewed articles were selected using this final search strategy.
The overall search strategy employed a number of different search engines to
capture both breadth and depth of the overall topic area. The timeframe employed for
Google searches went as far back as 1995 in an attempt to capture an adequate historical
perspective of the research topic. Fewer than 8% of the articles cited in this dissertation
are before 2007. All other literature searches (92%) used a publication date of 2008 and
newer as a search limiter to elicit current research in the field of study.
Pharmaceutical companies have historically faced central challenges of time and
expense to bring new medications to market (Festel, Sticker, & Boutellier, 2010). During
the 20th Century, a productive working relationship existed between medical academic
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institutions and the pharmaceutical industry (Maahs, 2012). This working partnership was
credited for significant medical advancements because of collaborative research projects
(Brody, 2011a; Furman & MacGarvie, 2009). This relationship became strained at the
beginning of the 21st Century as concerns about the pharmaceutical industry exercising
undue influence, potential research bias, and concerns over patient safety were reported
(Angell, 2008; Lexchin, Bero, Djubegovic, & Clark, 2003; Sismondo, 2007; Yank,
Rennie, & Bero, 2007). The overall integrity of medication safety in the United States
was questioned when Merck withdrew the multibillion dollar pain reliever Rofecoxib
from the market in September, 2004 when serious and/or fatal cardiovascular risks and
complications surfaced (Psaty & Charo, 2007).
Brennan et al. (2006) published seminal work, which called for wide sweeping
changes and policy development in the way in which healthcare professionals interacted
with the pharmaceutical industry. Concerns about COI, including patient safety, lack of
transparency, and the potential for undue influence exercised by the pharmaceutical
industry over healthcare professionals were identified as some of the reasons calling for
such a change. This resulted in a dramatic shift in the way in which medical academia
and the pharmaceutical industry interacted when a growing number of institutions
adopted restrictive COI and interaction policies (Rothman & Chimonas, 2008).
The IOM issued wide sweeping policy recommendations with regard to conflict
across the entire medical field in 2009 (Lo & Field, 2009). Three major policy reforms
were called for at both the institutional and the governmental level to include medical
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academic centers establishing comprehensive COI policies, a publicly available national
register for all medical industry concerns to report all financial arrangements with
physicians, and finally, for the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to
employ evidence based measures to determine the effectiveness of the COI policy and
unintended consequences from such a policy. Medical academic institutions were directly
called upon to incorporate 10 major elements into COI policies ranging from institutional
COI development to policy governing physician interaction and financial involvement
with the pharmaceutical industry.
Congress reacted to the 2009 IOM Report and passed the PPSA of 2010 that
required medical industry concerns to report on a publicly available database all
payments to physicians and institutions in the United States. The DHHS started to make
this information available beginning 2014 (American Medical News, 2013). The NIH
followed with rule changes in 2011 concerning medical institutions that receive federal
research and mandated institutional COI policy, reporting requirements, and lowering the
financial reporting levels of researchers involved with industry.
Faced with increased costs for developing new medications (Festel et al., 2010),
and a more restrictive operating environment, pharmaceutical companies significantly
slowed the rate of growth of medical research grants provided to academic institutions
(Dorsey et al., 2010). A reduction in the number of medical academic physicians
involved in industry-sponsored research was reported as well (Zinner et al., 2009).
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It is recognized that scientific advancements require collaboration (but not
coercion) between all parties involved (McKinnon, 2009). The development of restrictive
interaction and COI policies by the medical academic community created a contentious
environment within which industry and academia operate. This is a problem because the
unintended consequence of this operating environment may have led to stifling
advancements in medicine as a result of reduced research funding, institution mistrust
between parties, and a misalignment of collaborative effort.
In Chapter 2, I discuss the overall topic and the central issues studied in this
dissertation. I present a brief history of interactions between the pharmaceutical industry
and the medical academic community from the last 10 years and included topics about
undue influence, research bias, COI, and policy reform. Additionally, I report topics that
included research funding reductions, the practice of “out sourced” (even out of the
country) research, and the future of collaboration. Finally, I provide a brief discussion of
ACF as the conceptual framework employed for this study.
Published Authors' Potential Bias and Effect on Entire Body of Literature
The overall issue of the pharmaceutical industry and its interactions with
healthcare professionals and institutions could be considered a political hot topic and one
where researchers, editors, and peer-reviewed journals may have introduced their own
personal or organizational biases into the topic with regard to research design and
approach, commentary, and article selection. An in-depth disclosure review of all authors
referenced in this dissertation was not performed. However, a number of key authors
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were identified as Brody (2005, 2006, 2009, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2012), Sismondo
(2007) and Stossel (2007, 2008). An author search in Science Citation Index Expanded
was conducted to determine how widely these authors were published from 2005 to 2013.
A search of five of the 10 largest United States based pharmaceutical industry websites
that disclosed payments to healthcare professionals found no payments disclosed for any
of these major authors (Allergan, 2013; CNN Money, 2013; Johnson & Johnson, 2013;
Lilly, 2013; Merck, 2013; Pfizer, 2013).
Brody (2005, 2006, 2009, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2012) was the most highly
published author on this topic in the research domains of life sciences and biomedicine,
physical sciences, and social sciences. Brody was also most prominently affiliated with
the University of Texas Medical – Galveston, Michigan University, and had no
disclosures of financial affiliation with the pharmaceutical industry. Brody's work was
highly critical of the pharmaceutical industry and the potential effect of undue influence
and research bias. Brody did, however, take the position that collaboration between these
two entities was very essential to advancing healthcare science. Stossel (2007, 2008) was
the next most highly published in the research domains of life sciences and biomedicine,
physical sciences, and social sciences. Brody was most prominently affiliated with
Harvard University and his work would be considered propharmaceutical in nature.
Brody's major position was that interactions between these two entities did not
immediately translate into a COI and that these interactions were important for scientific
development.
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Sismondo (2007) was also cited in the research domains of life sciences and
biomedicine, social sciences, and technology, and was affiliated with Queens UniversityCanada and had no reported ties to the pharmaceutical industry. Sismondo's work was the
most critical of the pharmaceutical industry and its interactions with academia. He was
the most vocal on the topic of the pharmaceutical industry exercising undue influence on
the entire research process when involved with medical academic institutions. It should
be noted that being Canadian, Sismondo may have had a systemic and institutional bias
against the pharmaceutical industry being based in a socialist medical delivery system
that has been credited with very few new medication developments.
Potential Bias: Researcher
As provided in Appendix A, I disclose that I have a financial interest with Pfizer.
Care with regard to objectivity and working from a bias free approach was taken during
the literature review process. An analysis of references cited in this dissertation is
considered a mixture of proindustry, neutral, and antiindustry, peer-reviewed journal
articles.
Conceptual Framework
The ACF was initially developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith during the late
1980s to early 1990s to understand coalition behavior and structure, the influence of
science and information technology on policy development, and the role of contentious
policy subsystems on policy change and behavior (Birkland, 2001; Sabatier, 1999;
Sabatier & Jenkins, 1988). This theoretical framework has been applied worldwide across
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a wide array of policy topics to include education and drug policy (University of
Colorado – Denver, 2013).
The articles presented in the literature review are a combination of qualitative,
quantitative, case study, and editorial commentaries in peer-reviewed medical and
scientific journals. Rarely, if any, of these articles referenced a conceptual or theoretical
framework as the basis for the work presented. For example, Sismondo (2007) sought to
determine if positive research results for a medication study could be linked to the
funding sponsor. He answered the research question by conducting a qualitative metaanalysis review of 19 previous studies examining this topic. The approach was significant
in that it synthesized a large array of research and answered the question at hand but
provided no theoretical or conceptual basis for doing the research itself. This was
extremely common across all research reviewed. It could be argued that this was a
systematic flaw of all research on this topic.
The two central qualitative research questions addressed in this dissertation deal
with COI policy development by the medical academic community and potential effect
on research funding placement by the pharmaceutical industry (Maahs, 2012). Concepts
around ACF were used to develop the lens upon which the literature review was
conducted. That is, the views and actions of several subsystems were evaluated when the
literature review was conducted. The contentious nature of the overall topic as well as the
strained relationships between these entities was recognized as being consistent with the
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tenets of ACF. That said, I employed concepts of ACF that facilitated an informed
approach to the literature review and was useful in the research design for this study.
Review of Literature
History of Collaboration
A long history of collaboration between the pharmaceutical industry and United
States based medical academic institutions was recognized for tremendous advancements
in science and medicine. Furman and MacGarvie (2009) reported a symbiotic and
progressive relationship between these entities in that academic science contributed
greatly to the transformation of emerging apothecary type pharmaceutical firms to
research-intensive institutions and the support that industry played in the establishment of
enduring scientific programs at the university level. Furman and MacGarvie concluded
that the development of industrial based research platforms and the evolution of the
higher education were two crucial elements regarding technological advancement in the
United States. Furman and MacGarvie further reported that pharmaceutical companies
that actively collaborated with academia had higher rates of patenting new medications
and industrial laboratory expansion.
Potential Research Bias Reported
Concerns with regard to research quality and bias and the extent to which the
pharmaceutical industry had exercised a growing control over the research process at
academic centers has been reported over the last 20 years (Angell, 2008; Lexchin et al.,
2003; Sismondo, 2007; Yank et al., 2007). A number of studies were completed
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examining favorable study results tied back to the funding sponsor. Lexchin et al. (2003)
examined 30 studies in a case-control analysis comparing industry-sponsored research
versus other sources of funding research conducted from 1966 to 2002 and found that
medical research supported by the pharmaceutical industry was more likely to have
outcomes favorable to the sponsoring of entities' medications as compared to results
supported by another funding source (OR = 4.05; 95% CI = 2.98 to 5.51). Sismondo
(2007) conducted a qualitative review of 19 previous analyses of research trials and
found 17 of the analyses (89%) showed positive study results favoring the industry trial
sponsor (Maahs, 2012). Moreover, Yank et al. (2007) evaluated 124 published metaanalyses of antihypertensive drugs and found that 40% of studies had financial ties to a
pharmaceutical company; while financial affiliation was not necessarily associated with
favorable results, funding sponsor was the only characteristic significantly linked to
favorable conclusions.
Researchers reported a number of postulations to explain the tendency of
favorable study results tied back to funding sponsorship. Lexchin et al. (2003) offered
four different possibilities to explain funding sponsorship linked to favorable results.
First, pharmaceutical companies potentially picked comparator medications that were
inferior to the medication being researched. Lexchin et al. found, however, that
researchers could not accurately predict results of trials in advance. Second, positive
results were tied to low quality study design and implementation. Lexchin et al.’s data
suggested, however, that industry-backed research was of comparable quality to
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nonindustry funded research. Third, study design with regard to how study medications
were used relative to comparator medications could predict outcome. Lexchin et al.
commented on the potential practice of a comparator medication being studied at a less
effective dose (lower potency) than the study medication. In this case, the less effective
dose medication (comparator medication) would then to be closer to placebo with regard
to efficacy and the medication at the higher dose (study medication) could then
statistically separate from both placebo and the comparator medication. Lexchin et al.
discussed that their data did not adequately capture this potential explanation. Finally,
Lexchin et al. reported that publication bias (the desire for research to be published)
could be another factor in favorable study results. Additionally, Lexchin et al.
commented on the questionable tactic by pharmaceutical companies to suppress
nonstatistically significant research findings which would have a potentially profound
effect on FDA medication approvals. Lexchin et al., however, did not take on the issue
of undue influence or COI being credited for positive study results.
Sismondo (2007) suggested the nature of funding itself created a systematic bias
that could not be corrected alone by scientific methodological design considerations.
Sismondo further reported a tendency toward actively publishing positive study results,
and discussed practices relative to ghost writing of clinical research trials. Sismondo did,
however, glance at the overall topic of COI and undue influence and recommended
additional consideration with regard to transparency and disclosure, rigorous study
reporting standards, and clinical trial registries.
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One argument concerning a tendency toward favorable research results has been
linked not just to research dollars placed with medical academic institutions, but the
practice of the pharmaceutical industry having access to and interactions with medical
professionals. Campbell et al. (2007) and Zinner et al. (2009) conducted mailed surveys
to faculty and staff at both public and private academic medical centers, and between 50
to nearly 60 % of medical professionals had some form of interaction with the
pharmaceutical industry (Maahs, 2012). These interactions varied greatly from casual
contact and meeting with pharmaceutical representatives, to serving on a pharmaceutical
company’s Board of Directors.
Undue Influence and Conflict of Interest Issues Reported
The pharmaceutical industry historically spent a significant amount of money
promoting its medications directly or indirectly to healthcare professionals. A study by
Wazana (2000) set in context many of the practices the pharmaceutical industry
employed and its effectiveness to influence prescribing behavior and product advocacy.
Wazana reported that pharmaceutical companies spent upwards of $11 billion per year in
marketing efforts, with around $5 billion used by sales representatives that called on
physicians. Wazana estimated that total marketing efforts ranged from $8,000 to $13,000
yearly per physician. Dana and Lowenstein (2008) also examined the practice of gift
giving by the pharmaceutical industry from a social science perspective and the effect on
relationships between industry and healthcare provider.
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Wazana (2000) conducted a meta data analysis and synthesis of 29 peer reviewed
studies about physician interactions and involvement with the pharmaceutical industry
and corresponding attitudes about the pharmaceutical industry, disease state knowledge,
and prescribing behavior of physicians. Wazana found that interactions between
healthcare professionals and pharmaceutical industry representatives were generally
endorsed, began during medical school, and upon entering practice continued at an
average frequency of four visits per month total from a pharmaceutical representative
(total industry). The types of interactions and financial support included product
presentations, medication samples, promotional giveaways, free gifts, free meals,
sponsored Continuing Medical Education (CME) seminars, travel, food and lodging for
CME events, compensated speaker bureau positions, research funding, and compensated
advisory board engagements. The overall results from this study (Wazana, 2000) showed
a statistically significant positive association between physician interaction with the
pharmaceutical industry and change in prescription behavior favorable to the
pharmaceutical industry (brand name vs. generic) as well as a physician endorsement for
favorable hospitable or health plan formulary placement for branded medications.
Wazana concluded that the extent of industry and physician interactions was widespread
and needed to be further addressed by new policy and education. This report further
opened up the entire topic of undue influence and potential COIs between healthcare
professionals and the pharmaceutical industry for the next decade.
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Sierles et al. (2005) reported that interactions between the pharmaceutical
industry and medical school students were very common and quite extensive. Sierles et
al.'s survey of 1,143 third-year medical students from eight public and private schools
found that on average these students attended one industry sponsored lunch or received
one gift on a weekly basis. Sierles et al. also reported that the majority of students were
not aware of any policies at their respective schools that addressed or restricted such
activities. The overall conclusion of Sierles et al. was medical school students were at
risk for undue influence by the pharmaceutical industry, and further research should be
conducted to ensure physician decision-making is based purely on best outcomes for
patients.
Insel (2010) provided further editorial comment about the issue of conflicts of
interest and erosion in public trust in the psychiatry field when it was reported that
several leading academic psychiatrists failed to report financial ties to the pharmaceutical
industry. Insel additionally noted that undisclosed financial relationships were not
singular to the field of psychiatry and was commonplace across a wide array of medical
specialties. Insel, however, did argue that collaboration still needed to exist between
industry and academia, and policy development needed to address financial disclosure
and transparency.
Patient Safety and Challenges at the Food and Drug Administration
Kuehn (2008) asserted that the underfunding of the FDA from the 1990s through
2000s left the agency incapable of meeting growing demands relative to medication
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safety and public health. Additional critics contended that the FDA oversight of the
pharmaceutical industry as a whole as well as the process for evaluating new medications
and monitoring the safety of medications already on the market was lax and presented
significant patient safety risks (Mitka, 2006; Wood, 2006). A prime example of this
potential disconnect was the events surrounding the removal of the multi-billion dollar
pain medication Rofecoxib. Marketed by Merck, Rofecoxib was withdrawn from the
market in late 2004 when pre marketing and post marketing serious and/or fatal
cardiovascular side effects were found to be linked to the medication (Psaty, Meslin, &
Breckenridge, 2012). The highly publicized manner in which a pharmaceutical company
would allow a potentially fatal medication to stay on the market and the inability of the
FDA to quickly catch this type of event eroded public trust in safety monitoring for
prescription medications. Kuehn (2009) further criticized the FDA for little effort in
monitoring conflicts of interest relative to clinical trial researchers when it was reported
that of the 118 applications approved by the FDA in 2007, more than 41% did not have
sufficient financial disclosures. Additionally, Kuehn reported that in 20% of the instances
where a potential or perceived COI was revealed, no corrective action was taken by either
sponsoring entity or the FDA. Congress took action in part and passed the FDA
Amendments Act of 2007 which provided the FDA new resources and the authority to
require post marketing studies as well as implement active medication surveillance safety
system to capture spontaneous adverse events (Psaty, Meslin, & Breckenridge, 2013).
This legislation was consistent with a 2007 IOM report that charged the FDA with taking

38
a life-cycle approach to medication monitoring and safety as opposed to focusing efforts
on medication safety prior to approval. Through September, 2011, the FDA had ordered
675 post market studies of which 87% were on schedule (Psaty, Meslin, & Breckenridge,
2012).
The underfunding of the FDA was partially acted on when Congress passed the
US Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act in October, 2012
(Steinbrook & Sharfstein, 2012). This essentially, renewed a major funding source for the
FDA by allowing the FDA to continue collect fees from industry with prescription drug
user fees being renewed since 1992 and medical device user fees from 2012. The
increased sources and amount of funding across industry was planned to allow the FDA
to hire more scientists with the intent on better monitoring and reduced prescription and
medical device application review times. For instance, the filing fee in 2012 for a new
drug application with clinical data review increased to $ 1.8 million (Wapner, 2012).
Overall approval times from the FDA were still problematic in that the time for priority
review has decreased from an average of 2 years to 1.1 years while a backlog of over
2,500 over applications for drug approvals still remains (Steinbrook & Sharfstein, 2012).
A review of the literature showed that Congress, DHHS, and the IOM did not
directly charge the FDA with taking on the topic of COI. Congress essentially passed
legislation to strengthen the FDA’s ability to deliver on its public health mandate relative
to medication approval, safety, and monitoring and left the larger issue of COI to the
DHHS which is discussed later in this chapter.
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Reform: Call for Conflict of Interest Policy Development
In January 2006, Brennan et al. published the seminal work that led to a series of
policy developments at the university level with regard to COI and interactions with the
pharmaceutical industry. Brennan et al. defined that COIs occurred when a physician’s
motives were, or they were placed in a situation where the moral decision making process
with regard to patient care and safety could have been compromised by personal gain,
association with the pharmaceutical industry, or being influenced by marketing and
promotion practices. They directly called on medical academic centers to lead the way in
wide sweeping reform in the way in which the entire healthcare industry interacted with
the pharmaceutical industry. Brennan et al.'s rationale was that academia needed to
provide leadership for medicine in the United States, had a responsibility to train medical
students and staff on issues of COI, and had the capacity to quickly enact new policies.
They directly recommended the following: eliminate all gifts, free meals, medication
samples, direct or indirect sponsorship of all CME activities, participation in speaker
bureaus, authorships associated with ghostwriting practices, reimbursement for travel to
CME activities, and barring hospital or medical group formulary committee member
from any financial relationship with the pharmaceutical industry. They did recognize,
however, that new medication development depended on input from academia and
consulting and research support from industry should not be strictly prohibited. They
further recommended that these types of interactions should be highly regulated and fully
transparent. Cosgrove and Bursztajn (2009) further elaborated on transparency and
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disclosure recommendations and reported that most COI polices did not address general
funding provided to an academic department for research or medical department for
continuing education. Cosgrove and Bursztajn recommended that full disclosure of these
indirect sources of funds be required.
A task force appointed by ABIMF and the Institute on Medicine as a Profession
(IOMAP) in 2004 published its policy recommendations about COI in 2006 and the
Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) followed with its recommendations
in 2008 (Rothman & Chimonas, 2008). Both sets of recommendations were consistent
with reforms called for by Brennan et al. (2006), but the AAMC recommendation sought
to ban pharmaceutical representatives from medical academic centers and considered any
provided food by the pharmaceutical industry as a “gift” and thereby prohibiting it under
the zero dollar limit for gift-giving. Additional authors published various studies and
commentaries consistently supporting this reform movement (Angell, 2008; Miller, 2009;
Robertson, Rose, & Kesselheim 2012; Rodwin, 2011; 2012; Rothman et al., 2009;
Steinbrook, 2009).
The most prolific author with regard to COI policies was Brody with seven
articles published in medical journals in the last 10 years (2005; 2006; 2009; 2010;
2011a; 2011b; 2012). Brody's work was generally supportive of the policy reform
recommendations made by Brennan et al. (2006), but was critical of the thought process
that mere association with industry is a COI. Brody's research actively moved the issue
forward and focused the argument on balancing the moral, ethical, and integrity concerns
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of the healthcare profession with the need for collaboration and transparency in the
pursuit of medical advancement and treatment. Brody's views remained conceptual and
philosophical, as he never fully articulated his stance on a point-by-point basis with
regard to policy development called for by the AAMC or IOM. The effect of this call for
reform was quite profound in the number of institutions that quickly adopted COI
policies. Rothman and Chimonas (2008) reported that more than 25 public and private
medical institutions had adopted COI policies representing the entire United States to
include University of Massachusetts –Worcester, University of Pennsylvania, University
of Wisconsin, Pittsburgh University, Yale University, University of Michigan, University
of Chicago, and all of the University of California system. Other healthcare delivery
systems had also adopted such policies, including Henry Ford Health Systems
(Michigan), Kaiser Permanente (California), and the Veterans Administration health
system.
Institute of Medicine 2009 Report on Conflict of Interest
The IOM appointed the Committee on COI in Medical Research, Education, and
Practice in 2007, and published its policy recommendations in 2009 (Lo & Field, 2009).
This report was funded in part by the NIH and was endorsed by the NAS and the NRC.
The IOM recommended that all medical institutions, including patient advocacy groups,
academic medical institutions, professional societies, and medical journals, all establish
COI policies. The IOM called for full transparency about individual and institutional
financial disclosure of ties to industry. The IOM acknowledged the extensive nature of
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commercial ties to medical education and recommended that teaching hospitals and
academic medical institutions enact the following measures with regard to COI (Lo &
Field, 2009)
1.

Board level involvement at the individual institution level to develop
comprehensive COI policy.

2. Researchers should not be involved in research in human subjects if they have
a financial interest in the outcome unless researcher expertise is vital to the
safe conduct of the research itself.
3. Ban faculty from receiving any gifts from industry.
4. Prohibit faculty from involvement in industry speaker bureaus.
5. Prohibit faculty from claiming authorship for ghost-written articles.
6. Prohibit the provision of free meals from industry.
7. Prohibit faculty from entering into consulting arrangements not recognized for
expert services at fair market value.
8. Restrict pharmaceutical sales representative access to medical academic
centers.
9. Restrict medication samples to only economically challenged patients.
10. Separate CME activities from industry influence.
At a broader health policy level, the IOM called for three major changes. First, the
IOM called on the DHHS to develop an evidenced based research platform to determine
further COI policies to include an examination of the impact of said policies on both
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desired outcomes and unintended consequences. Additionally, the IOM sought a
standardized method for all facets of medicine to disclose financial relationships with
industry. Finally, the IOM called on Congress to require the creation of a national
reporting platform to disclose all pharmaceutical, medical devices, biotechnology firm’s
payments to physicians, patient advocacy and disease groups, health care institutions,
researchers, and professional societies (Lo & Field, 2009).
Reform Post 2009 Institute of Medicine Report
Congress reacted to the 2009 IOM’s recommendation and passed the PPSA in
2010 (American Medical News, 2013). The provisions of this act were generally
consistent with the IOM 2009 recommendations and required all medical device,
pharmaceutical, and biotechnology companies to report all payments to physicians and
institutions. The implementation of the PPSA was somewhat delayed with all firms being
required to make these disclosures to the DHHS beginning in the second half of 2013.
The DHHS disclosure website will be available in 2014 (American Medical News, 2013).
Many of the largest pharmaceutical companies started making these disclosures available
via their respective websites beginning 2009 through 2011.
The NIH as an agency of the DHHS is largest source of funding for medical
research in the world (2011). From 2003 to 2008, nearly one-third all research funding
placed in United States based medical academic centers came from the NIH (Dorsey et
al., 2010). In August 2011, the NIH made a number of rule changes to the previous COI
policy rules issued in 1995 (2011). Researchers were then required to disclose to their
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respective institutions all significant financial interests related to their organization with
the annual monetary threshold being reduced from $10,000 to $5,000. It also required by
the NIH that institutions provide reporting on COI to include policy, management, and
institutional training to researchers (NIH, 2011). It is interesting to note that while the
NIH made some rule changes, it did not establish a standard of COI policy for institutions
to adhere to as was called for by the IOM. This left the primary burden of actual COI
policy development, enactment, and enforcement to the actual medical academic centers
themselves.
When examining the provisions of the PPSA of 2010 and the 2011 NIH rule
changes regarding COI combined, institutions should have an easier time managing and
enforcing potential COI issues beginning in 2014. When the DHHS website starts making
publicly available all payments physicians receive from the medical industry, an
institution will not have to trust that a faculty member made the appropriate financial
disclosures regarding financial arrangements with industry. As a part of institutional COI
enforcement, academia will now be able to look up an individual faculty member to
determine if they, in fact, have made the proper financial disclosures. This also created an
interesting format for the NIH to audit COI issues at the individual and institution level if
it sees fit.
Adherence to the actual recommendations set forth by the IOM was challenged by
Poses (2012) who reported that an accurate accounting of how well institutions had
adopted such polices and the corresponding disclosure requirement by physicians having
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a financial arrangement with industry had been overstated and lax. This combined with
the reporting of financial relationships by industry to the DHHS made for a potentially
contentious situation for institutions that discover that faculty members have been underreporting or not reporting financial ties to industry.
The American Medical Association (AMA) representing, approximately 213,000
healthcare providers in the United States, has not updated its COI guidelines with regard
to institutions since 2007 (AMA, 2007). The AMA contented that organized medical
staffs were self-governing entities and the COI policy development was an individual
institutional responsibility. The AMA provided a very general definition of what COI
was (consistent with the commonly accepted definition) and provided proposed
disclosure forms that institutions could require their respective healthcare providers to
use to report financial arrangements with industry. It is interesting that the AMA has not
acted on this topic, has not implemented any of the 2009 IOM recommendations, and has
let the 2009 IOM recommendations stand without its own institutional guideline update
to its members.
The IOM released further updated and more specific guidelines on COI in early
2011 (IOM, 2013). Within the topic of medical organizations creating clinical practice
guidelines, the IOM recommended that any healthcare professional being considered for
inclusion to a development guideline group should be required to make full disclosure on
any potential COI. Furthermore, if a healthcare professional was selected to a
development group, he or she should fully divest himself or herself (to include family
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members) from any financial interest with industry that could constitute or have the
appearance of a COI.
Counter Point: Conflict of Interest Reform Challenged
The call for all encompassing policy reform from 2006 through the 2009 IOM’s
Report on COI was not widely accepted across the entire medical community and was
challenged by numerous authors (Beran, 2009; Brody 2010; Flier, 2009; GonzalezCampoy, 2009; Stossel, 2007; 2008). The common theme argued by these authors was
that the mere association or contact with the pharmaceutical industry and healthcare
professionals did not necessarily equal a conflict of interest, and no evidence has yet or
had then been provided showing an adverse effect on patient care. Additionally, they
commented on tremendous advancements in medicine development credited to the
collaboration between industry and academia.
One recommendation by the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC)
to ban the practice of pharmaceutical representatives conducting sales presentations was
directly challenged by Huddle (2010), who offered that the mere exchange of information
would not create a patient decision-making error by the physician was therefore not an
unethical exchange and was therefore a flawed argument to consider. Huddle reasoned
that physicians had the capacity to make informed decisions and to compartmentalize
interactions with industry in an appropriate manner. Huddle further observed that to
propose such policy discredited the profession, was not scientifically based, and
discounted the value of information pharmaceutical representatives actually possessed.
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A number of medical professional associations countered with their own
statements concerning COI and interaction with the pharmaceutical industry. The
American College of Cardiology, American College of Emergency Physicians, American
College of Radiology, American College of Rheumatology, American
Gastroenterological Association, and the American Society of Plastic Surgeons issued a
joint statement that medical professional societies had an ethical and positive relationship
with industry (2009). While these organizations may not represent private or public
institutions per se, they do represent the individual doctors that practice within those
institutions but have an affiliation with a medical society that represents their particular
medical specialty. For instance, when the medical community looks for treatment
guidelines for rheumatoid arthritis, they do not consult the AAMC; the American College
of Rheumatology provides this expertise. These professional medical societies added that
without external support from industry, they would be unable to provide the same level of
education and patient care advancements moving forward. Additionally, these societies
reported that restrictive interaction and COI policies would stifle scientific advancement
and offered that policy development needed to address issues of product bias and could
be accomplished through collaborative and transparent policies.
The American Association of Clinical Endocrinologists (AACE) and the
American College of Endocrinology (ACE) issued their own statement affirming the
value they placed on the interaction between physicians and the pharmaceutical industry
(2009). The AACE and ACE reported such interactions had been consistent with ethical
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standards and had been responsive to patient needs. Additionally, the AACE and ACE
contented that no inherent COI existed, and both the AACE and ACE had formulated
policies with regards to collaborative interactions with industry.
A group of physicians formed the Association of Clinical Researchers and
Educators (ACRE) in direct response to the COI reform movement (Bloomgarden, 2009).
This association directly challenged the notion that interaction, association, or affiliation
between healthcare professionals and industry was inherently an issue of COI. They
countered that managing this issue from the basis of perception was short sighted and
would have the unintended consequences and outcomes. Finally, they offered that
limiting the free flow of support to academic medical institutions, professional societies,
and health advocacy organizations threatened to delay medical advancement, innovation,
and education.
Self-Regulation in the Face of Conflict of Interest and Disclosure
The pharmaceutical industry has reacted numerous times to public and
governmental pressure and self-regulated many of its marketing and promotional
practices during the last 20 years. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America (PhRMA; 2003) was formed in 1958 initially to represent America’s
pharmaceutical research companies and seek essential alignment between public policy
and medical research to address patient needs. PhRMA voluntarily adopted promotional
guidelines in 1991 after congressional hearings raised concern over marketing practices
that were considered expensive and eroded public trust (Katz, Caplan, & Merz, 2010).
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The practice of “gift” giving was reduced to items under $100 and had to have relevance
to a medical practice, which included “branded” pens, notepads, and staplers. The “lavish
gift giving” practices that included golf outings, tickets to sporting events, and expensive
meals was eliminated.
The PhRMA Board adopted its revised Code on Interactions with Health Care
Professionals in 2008, which further refined its members conduct with regard to
marketing, communications, and interactions with health care providers. All
noneducational items such as pens and notepads were prohibited. “Gifts,” such as items
or entertainment considered to be for personal benefit were reaffirmed as being
unacceptable. Pharmaceutical representatives were allowed to provide occasional meals,
provided they were modest and only offered in an office or hospital setting. The
exception to this was the recognized promotional and educational practice of conducting
a “dinner program,” where a formal educational presentation could be presented in
conjunction with a meal at an off-site restaurant, hotel, or conference center.
The next wave of self-regulation occurred when individual pharmaceutical
companies started disclosing payments to health care providers under the pressure of the
medical community and the passage of the PPSA of 2010 (American Medical News,
2013). The American Medical News reported that all pharmaceutical and medical device
manufacturers would have to publicly disclose, via searchable database, all gifts and
payments made to healthcare professionals by September, 2014. Eli Lilly and
GlaxoSmithKline started reporting health care professional payments in 2009 with Pfizer,
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Johnson & Johnson, and Merck following suit in 2010. Novartis and AstraZeneca started
reporting payments in 2011. These companies represented four of the five largest
pharmaceutical companies in the United States, and five of the 10 largest worldwide
pharmaceutical companies, in terms of total sales (CNN & Money, 2013; Contract
Pharma, 2013).
Food and Drug Administration New Medication Approvals Stagnant
Dorsey et al. (2010) reported that from 1994 to 2003 research funding for new
medication development nearly doubled (adjusted for inflation) while the number of new
medication approvals from the FDA remained stagnant. Dorsey et al. also observed that
from 2003 to 2007 research investment started to stall and FDA new medication
approvals continued to be flat. Data provided by the FDA (2013) in Table 1 reports the
number of priority and standard new molecular entities (NMEs) and biologic license
approvals (BLAs) and medication review times from 1997 to 2008.

51
Table 1
FDA Medication Approvals and Review Times
Calendar year

Total medication
approvals

1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

33
34
37
37
31
27
25
25
24
23
23
24

FDA review
time priority
(months)
10.0
8.4
6.9
6.5
6.2
7.7
7.8
7.7
7.7
7.7
6.1
6.0

FDA review
time standard
(months)
18.9
15.9
14.2
14.1
14.4
14.0
14.3
14.7
14.8
14.1
14.2
14.0

The above information was only available from the FDA (2013) through 2008. It
is interesting to observe that from 2003 to 2008 the number of medications approved did
not vary by more than two and the median FDA review time whether priority or standard
application was relatively stable beginning in 2000. Raw data from the FDA (2013) from
NMEs and BLAs continued to show a relative flat number of approvals. Table 2 reports
this information as well as a 5 year running average of combined NME and BLA
approvals from the FDA.
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Table 2
FDA Medication Approvals With 5-Year Running Average
Calendar year

NME approvals

BLA approvals

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

17
21
31
18
18
16
17
20
21
24
32

0
0
5
2
4
2
3
6
0
6
5

Total approvals: 5 year
running average

23.2
23.4
23.2
21.2
21.4
23.0
26.8

One could argue that increased application fees paid by the pharmaceutical
industry would lead to a decreased number of NME or BLA applications submitted to the
FDA. Application fees charged by the FDA increased to $ 1.8 million that require a
clinical review (Wapner, 2012). This would be considered not a significant barrier to
medication development; however, as it has been reported by numerous authors that total
new medication research and development costs through the approval process are around
now around $800 million (Festel et al., 2010).
Research Funding Placement to Academia
The literature, with regard to pharmaceutical funding at the academic university
level, was not widely reported. Two studies from the late 2000s attempted to answer this
general question. Research by Zinner et al. (2009) sought to measure interactions and
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relationships between academic scientists and the pharmaceutical industry. They
surveyed 3,080 medical academic professionals in 2007 and found that 53% of them had
some form of industry contact or financial relationship. Zinner et al. also reported that
academic professionals that had industry support (sponsored funding) had higher levels
of productivity (published research) than those that did not. Zinner et al. (2009) also
compared survey results with similar surveys they conducted in 1985 and 1995 and found
in 1985 23% of academic scientists were involved as principal investigators on research
projects, compared to 21% in 1995, and 17% in 2007. While this did not assess research
dollars awarded to university research institutions, it adequately reported a shrinking
trend in the percentage of faculty members involved in industry sponsored research trials.
Dorsey et al. (2010) sought to directly measure the funding of United States based
medical research at academic institutions by the pharmaceutical industry from 2003 to
2008. They examined publicly available data to quantify funding from federal, state, and
local governments, as well as private and pharmaceutical industry sources during the
timeframe from 1994 to 2008. They found when comparing periods of 1994 to 2003, and
2003 to 2008, the compounded annual growth rate (adjusted for inflation) dropped
statistically significantly from 8% to 6% respectively. They also noted that the number of
new medication approvals did not increase from 2003 to 2008.
The combined research efforts of both Dorsey et al. (2010) and Zinner et al.
(2009) showed a decrease in the prevalence of industry sponsored research with academic
scientists and the overall slowdown of actual research funding placement on a dollarized
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basis. Both sets of research reported generalized observations about cost concerns relative
to new medication development and slowdown of new drug approvals. Zinner et al.
(2009) added, however, that the slowdown was also potentially due to restrictive policy
development and use of contract medication organizations in emerging market countries.
Contract Medical Organizations
As the growth of United States based pharmaceutical research began to slow
during the late 2000s, the practice of outsourcing to this function to contract medical
organizations in emerging market countries was reported (Abodor, 2010; Drabu, Gupta,
& Bhadauria, 2010; Festel et al., 2010; Zinner et al., 2009). Pharmaceutical giants, such
as Pfizer, Astra Zeneca, Eli Lily, and Novartis continued to shift research placement
abroad. The economic impact of this in India alone was quite dramatic at approximately
$70 million in 2003, with estimates upwards of $200 million by 2007, and projections up
to $1.5 billion by 2010 (Maiti & Raghavendra, 2007).
Several observed reasons contributed to the practice of employing contract
medical organizations. Masri, Ramierez, Popsescu, and Reggie (2007) cited cost
containment by industry, and the ability to be more nimble in a quickly changing
healthcare environment. Additional researchers offered increased costs domestically, a
slowing of new medications being approved by the FDA, and a more highly regulated
operating environment (Abodor, 2010; Festel et al., 2010). Zinner et al. (2009) reported
the possibility that newly adopted university policies restricting academic-industry
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relationships might have contributed additionally to the practice of using contract medical
organizations.
The same issues about research bias and integrity were raised by researchers
concerned about the relationship between the pharmaceutical industry and academic
universities (Sismondo, 2007: Yank et al., 2007) which was also reported with regard to
the practice of using contract medical organizations (Adobor, 2012; Zinner et al., 2009).
Festel et al. (2010) offered additional concerns with regard to overall research quality and
the potential loss of internal expertise. Whether placed domestically in the United States
with academic universities, or awarded internationally to contract medical organizations,
the pharmaceutical industry continued to be criticized in how it conducted its research
trials.
Transparency, Conflict of Interest, and Collaboration
McKinnon (2009) presented a compelling perspective with regard to the future of
public and private partnerships. He submitted that six key tenets have proved to be
effective in arriving at mutually productive public-private partnerships. A couple of those
tenets had the most application to the COI debate. First, that “doing good” and “making
money” were not separate concepts, but actually complementary. Additionally,
collaboration and honest dialogue about outcomes and agendas by both parties needed to
occur. Finally, both parties needed to agree to the larger shared objective. The practical
application of these tenets would support collaborative and transparent partnerships
between industry and academia to advance medical care in a responsible manner. Kitsis
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(2011) supported this concept, and called for a more collaborative approach to the entire
concept of COI. She stated that academia needed to establish reasonable steps to prevent
conflicts of interest, and the pharmaceutical industry needed to be held accountable, but
should be involved in the process and development policy.
Changes in science and technology have facilitated a new era of collaboration
between the pharmaceutical industry and medical academic institutions (Hughes, 2008).
Vallance, Williams, and Dollery (2010) best defined this when they noted that the
expertise at medical academic centers, and large research based pharmaceutical
companies is very different, and this partnership was necessary to facilitate new
medicine. From a quality perspective, impactful research has trended toward much
greater control over carefully conducted studies with smaller groups of patients using
expertly trained academic investigators. The authors noted, this was in contradiction to
the contract research organization model, where investigators followed a set protocol at
an agreed price. Vallance et al. (2010) believed that a cultural shift by both academia and
industry was required to make the collaborative model work. Concerns about COI needed
to be managed through disclosures and transparency; academia needed push aside its
prejudices about industry, and industry had to develop trust through openness and allow
more open publication of clinical trials.
Gap in the Literature
The literature review process did not answer some interesting questions with
regard to the overall topic of conflicts of interest, interactions between industry and
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academia, and research funding at medical academic centers. The 2009 IOM Report on
COI (Lo & Field, 2009) directly called on medical academic centers to adopt
comprehensive COI policies. The number and extent to which United States based
medical academic centers have actually adopted comprehensive interaction and COI
policies consistent with the IOM recommendations is unknown and warrants further
investigation. Additionally, the IOM (Lo & Field, 2009) charged the DHHS with the task
of evaluating the effectiveness of institutional COI policy to include unintended
consequences of these policies. It is unknown if the development of these policies has
potentially had an effect on pharmaceutical company research placement at medical
academic institutions and potential fallout of a research platform that is not as efficient or
effective at developing new medicines. The research design in this qualitative study
attempts to answer these basic questions and is presented in Chapter 3.
Summary
The nature of the relationship between medical academic institutions and the
pharmaceutical industry has changed from an environment that was once classified as
open, unrestricted, and unregulated. This relationship would now be typified as restricted,
regulated, and contentious. The exact extent to which this once positive working
relationship between these entities has become more restrictive and less collaborative in
the last 5 to 10 years is unknown as concerns about research bias; undue influence,
patient safety, and COI have facilitated numerous calls for reform. Policy development
by medical academic institutions has attempted to account for these issues through the
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enactment of interaction and COI policies. While generally observed that policies have
been adopted at the institutional level, it is unknown to what extent such policies would
be consistent with 2009 guidelines from the IOM concerning COI. Additionally, it is
unknown, from a monitoring, enforcement, and disclosure standpoint, if such policies are
effective. It is has been observed that research funding to medical institutions by the
pharmaceutical industry has slowed during the last 10 years (Dorsey et al., 2010; Maahs,
2012). My intention with this qualitative research was to more fully understand this
dynamic and the way in which this relationship has changed and the potential
implications on research funding. In Chapter 3, I provide an overview of the research
completed to include research questions, study design and methodology as well as ethical
issues, role of the researcher, and various study considerations.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
In this qualitative study, I investigated the extent to which academic medical
institutions adopted interaction and COI policies consistent with the 2009 IOM policy
recommendations (Lo & Field, 2009) concerning healthcare professionals’ relationships
with the pharmaceutical industry from 2007 (prepolicy recommendations) through 2014
(postpolicy recommendations). Additionally, the study was designed to determine the
nature of the relationships between pharmaceutical firms and medical academic
institutions when a financial arrangement existed. I designed this qualitative study to
more fully understand the rationale and decision making process of medical academic
institutions (and the pharmaceutical funding implications) when developing interaction
and COI policies, whether mandated or not. Finally, I discuss implications for social
change with regard to patient safety and medicine development in light of the revisions to
academia/pharmaceutical COI policies.
In Chapter 3, I present the qualitative research method and design that was
employed to address the two research questions. I also discuss information concerning
the role of the researcher, issues of trustworthiness, and ethical procedures. An in-depth
examination of exact methodology is presented to include sample selection process,
instrumentation, data collection, storage and data analysis is presented as well.
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Research Design and Rationale
Research Questions
Qualitative Research Question 1: Since the release of the IOM Policy Report (Lo
& Field, 2009), to what extent have interaction and COI policies been fully complied
with by United States based medical academic institutions, what were the rationale(s) and
decision making considerations involved in developing such policies, and how would
these institutions classify the current nature of their relationship with pharmaceutical
companies as opposed to pre 2009?
Qualitative Research Question 2: What are some of the effects that new COI
policies have had on pharmaceutical industry research funding for United States based
medical academic institutions since the implementation of the IOM Report (Lo & Field,
2009)?
Research Methodology
Creswell (2009) detailed many reasons to justify the qualitative research method.
Most simply, a problem needs to be explored and a complex and detailed understanding
of the issue is required. In the literature review from this qualitative study I reported a
slowdown of research funding by the pharmaceutical industry at the medical academic
institution level. One possible relationship is the development of noncollaborative
interaction policies developed after the 2009 IOM Report was issued (Lo & Field, 2009).
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Case Study Approach
In qualitative studies, many research approaches are available to the investigator.
A commonly employed method is the case study approach as presented by Creswell
(2007). This approach fits when a researcher is investigating multiple bounded systems
over time and an in-depth data collection is required from multiple sources
(triangulation), which also increases reliability and validity. In this qualitative case study,
I sought to examine multiple United States based medical academic institutions and the
evolution of interaction and COI policies from 2007 (pre 2009 IOM recommendations)
through 2014 and the potential corresponding effect on research funding placement. The
overall goal was to study 10 medical academic institutions in an in-depth manner
(including both an open-ended survey and semistructured interview).
Conceptual Framework
The conceptual framework chosen for this study was the ACF. Initially developed
by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith during the late 1980s to early 1990s, they sought to
understand coalition behavior and structure, the influence of science and information
technology on policy development, and the role of contentious policy subsystems on
policy change and behavior (Birkland, 2001; Sabatier & Jenkins, 1988). This conceptual
framework provided the lens that guided my research on many levels. Relative to study
design and methodology, I considered the contentious nature of the relationship between
the pharmaceutical industry and medical academic institutions.
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Role of the Researcher
As the primary investigator in this study, I was integral to many facets of the
research that included being an active participant in the research itself. Investigators need
to be mindful of their own personal biases when conducting research (Creswell, 2007). In
Appendix A I provide full disclosure of employment in the pharmaceutical industry. With
that in mind, I was prudent when establishing the working definition of collaborative or
noncollaborative institutions. Additionally, when I reviewed interaction and COI policies
provided by medical academic institutions, I worked from an objective point-of-view. To
facilitate this, I disclosed the criteria by which the collaborative or noncollaborative
institution assignment was derived. The goal is that upon review by someone in
academia, the assignment criteria employed would be considered both reasonable and
objective.
I do not have any immediate relatives employed by either medical academic
institutions or the pharmaceutical industry. Therefore, no other potential financial COI
exists other than my own. I have not had any direct contact with any of the 75 medical
schools initially selected as potential participants in this qualitative case study in the
capacity of my professional career. As discussed throughout this dissertation, I was
sensitive to my own potential bias and corresponding potential COI. This is, of course, a
study about COI and without being fully transparent it would be hypocritical.
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Methodology
Participant Selection Logic
The nature of the research problem drives the participant selection for this study.
That is, United States medical academic institutions were the study population for this
research. Seventy-five medical institutions identified as members of the AAMC (2013)
that teach and conduct medical research (Center for Measuring University Performance,
2013) were selected for initial inclusion as possible participants in this study. Potential
study participants were contacted via an email research letter requesting their voluntary
participation in the initial online survey with a further invitation for their participation in
the interview phase of the research. Miles and Huberman (1994) reported that in
qualitative research, sample size is not necessarily prespecified and usually evolves once
research actually begins. Due to the complex nature of the data analysis that was
performed, a participation size of 10 institutions was desired. Ideally, a mix of
approximately half public and private (nonprofit) would have allowed for another
differentiator of analysis.
Instrumentation
The main data collection tool being employed was an initial brief online survey
followed by an open-ended semi structured interview if the participant volunteered. The
data gathered from these tools included both finite and attitudinal data. The finite portion
of the survey asked for annual pharmaceutical research funding received and copies of
interaction and COI policies from 2007 (pre 2009 IOM recommendations) through 2014
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and research funding data from the pharmaceutical industry from 2007 through 2014. The
rationale for using data from this timeframe was to establish levels of research funding
prior to the 2009 IOM Report (Lo & Field, 2009) and after this major policy
recommendation (through 2014). The interview portion of data collection was the
attitudinal component and sought more information to fully understand the rationale and
decision making processes of institutions in light of the 2009 IOM Report (Lo & Field,
2009) and to clarify if research placement was affected by other elements than just the
adoption of collaborative versus noncollaborative interaction polices. Additionally,
interaction and COI policies were examined that have an implied attitudinal component
contained within them.
Researcher Developed Instrument: Survey and Interview
Basis
The open-ended survey portion of this research was intended to collect finite data
as well as establish if an institution was willing to participate in the interview portion of
the research. In qualitative research, the interview data collection method is common
when combined with the case study approach (Creswell, 2007). Through this study, I
intended to more fully understand a wide array of issues concerning COI policy
development, and the interview method of data collection allowed for an in-depth insight
to this phenomenon. All aspects of the research questions are addressed in the collection
of survey information as well as the interview portion of the study.
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Content Validity
Maxwell (2005) presented that with regard to content validity, research needs to
allow for competing factors and discrepant data. Maxwell further explained this in the
context that research conducted should not be an exercise in the investigator’s own selffulfilling prophecy. With regard to this study, I was sensitive and aware that I did not
intentionally design the study to show what I wanted it to show. That is, I had a
hypothesis that noncollaborative interaction policies had a negative effect on research
funding placement, but I remained as open-minded and unbiased as possible and let the
data drive the research. Without accounting for this in some fashion, my qualitative case
study would not have content validity. This was discussed in both the limitations and
delimitations sections in Chapter 1.
The semi structured interview questions were developed to specifically address
issues of content validity. For example, one institution may have adopted a
noncollaborative interaction policy while at the same time it elected to disengage in any
research with the pharmaceutical industry. Without developing a survey question to
account for this scenario, one might otherwise observe that research funding placement
went down as a result of an interaction policy. This would be a false assumption.
Additionally, I ensured that the interview questions were as open ended as possible and
were not leading an interviewee to provide answers that would be skewed in the direction
of what my initial instinct was that a possible explanation of decreased research
placement was a result of changes in policy post 2009 IOM Report (Lo & Field, 2009).
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Finally, with regard to issues of reliability, I had to assume that interviewees were
answering the interview questions consistently with the beliefs and decision making
process employed when COI policies were developed and were reflective of the
institution itself. With this in mind, the desired interviewee subject was the medical
director from the respective institution or an administrator with decision making authority
that was involved in COI issues.
Sufficiency of Data
The data collected were of sufficient depth to answer the two qualitative research
questions. Collecting data on research placement and examining interaction and COI
policies were fairly fixed pieces of data and were not unreasonable to produce sufficient
data and themes within the context of the research questions. It should be noted, however,
that within the parameters of Research Question 2, interview questions were developed to
account for compounding variables that if otherwise not addressed created problems of
content validity.
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection
Recruitment and Participation
A research request cover letter and Walden University IRB informed consent
forms with a link to the online survey was sent via email to the medical director of the 75
members of the AAMC that were actively engaged in medical research (Center for
Measuring University Performance, 2013) and are provided in Appendices B and C. The
main criteria for selection into the interview portion of the study was to be quality of
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initial survey responses provided, institution size, and willingness to participate in the
interview portion of the study. For example, a small institution with complete survey
answer input was chosen over a large institution with only partial survey answers
provided. The intention was to have over 10 medical academic institutions respond to the
initial survey and have 10 of them voluntarily complete the interview phase of the
research. The total initial amount of time allocated for both portions of the data collection
process was initially limited to 90 days once Walden University IRB approval (02-24-140168299) to proceed with research was granted.
Data Collection
Data were electronically collected from the online survey and included
information on research funding provided from the pharmaceutical industry to individual
medical academic centers and individual institution interaction and COI policies from
2007 to 2013. Additionally, data were collected about the nature of the research placed
and any circumstances that would explain large or small fluctuations of research
placement during the time studied. Information about the rationale and decision making
process employed by these institutions when interaction and COI policies were adopted
was collected as well. Data to answer both research questions were derived from the
review of online COI policies and the interview, which was audio recorded, transcribed,
and reviewed by each interviewee for accuracy (member checking).
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Data Analysis Plan
Coding Plan: General
Miles and Huberman (1994) described emergent coding as an effective way for
qualitative researchers to deal with significant amounts of information that need to be
collected, organized, and retrieved later. Discussed below, coding was important to
answering the two research questions as it was the primary means by which I was
measuring and assigning data particular values. For example, medical academic
institutions were ultimately assigned a code as “collaborative” or “noncollaborative” in
their dealing with the pharmaceutical industry. This was not predefined by me and
emerged over the course of the study.
Data Analysis and Coding: Research Question 1
Interaction and COI policies received from medical academic centers were
analyzed to determine how compliant an academic institution’s policies were to the 2009
IOM Report (Lo & Field, 2009) as well as if that institution was considered collaborative
or noncollaborative in its dealings with the pharmaceutical industry. The scoring
categories were consistent with the policy recommendations made by the 2009 IOM
Report on COI (Lo & Field, 2009). Accordingly, these COI policies were evaluated
against the following parameters:
1. Board-level involvement at the individual institution level to develop
comprehensive COI policy.
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2. Researchers should not be involved in research in human subjects if they have
a financial interest in the outcome unless researcher expertise is vital to the
safe conduct of the research itself.
3. Ban faculty from receiving any gifts from industry.
4. Prohibit faculty from involvement in industry speaker bureaus.
5. Prohibit faculty from claiming authorship for ghost-written articles.
6. Prohibit the practice of free meals from industry.
7. Prohibit faculty from entering into consulting arrangements not recognized for
expert services at fair market value.
8. Restrict pharmaceutical sales representative access to medical academic
centers.
9. Restrict medication samples to only economically challenged patients.
10. Separate CME activities from industry influence.
Coding was accomplished manually by assigning (scoring) a possible spectrum
score of zero points (did not comply) to 10 points (completely complied) on each of the
above parameters. Information was also gathered and coded with regard to institutional
rationale and decision making processes, stated or implied relationships with industry,
financial interest reporting, and enforcement issues. Inductive coding and theme
development was used to look for similarity and associations across many topics. These
were included but not limited to;
•

Similarity by individual institution to 2009 IOM Policy Report.
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•

Similarity by all institutions to 2009 IOM Policy Report.

•

Percent similarity among institutions to each other within/without each
parameter to 2009 IOM Policy Report.

•

Dissimilarity on above information to 2009 IOM Policy Report.

•

Emergent trends from data collection, coding, and theme development.

It is important to note that I did not predetermine the classification of
collaborative or noncollaborative. That is, institutions that had a lower policy similarity
score to the 2009 IOM Report (Lo & Field, 2009) would be considered more
collaborative than institutions that had a higher policy similarity score. In the spirit of the
qualitative research, an institution being classified as collaborative versus
noncollaborative emerged through the research process, data collection, and data
analysis. Analyses were done looking for data patterns to include private versus public
medical academic centers to ascertain if the type of institution was a differentiator with
regard to similarity to the 2009 IOM Report (Lo & Field, 2009). Additionally, similarity
of policy development across all study participants was examined. Finally, multiple
queries looked for patterns and associations within different policy categories. An
example of this could be that upon observation and analysis, academic centers that
allowed pharmaceutical representative access on their campuses had a tendency toward
allowing patient education materials, but not medication samples. Finally, multiple runs
of association were done to examine the rationale and decision making process
concerning COI policy development. These are just some of the ways in which the
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research data were analyzed and additional ways in which to analyze the initial data
collected emerged during this process as well.
Understanding the rationale and decision making process by conducting an
analysis of interaction and COI policies presented numerous challenges. This process
required not only figuring what was said within the body of a policy being examined, but
also deducing the larger meaning what a policy inferred with regard to institutional
rationale, motivation, self-interest, and bias. It was for this reason that the value of using
the interview method and to be able to ask open-ended and more comprehensive
questions was important for the depth and value of the information collected. Institutional
interview information and data from COI policies was coded and analyzed to look for
similarities, associations, and dissimilarities accordingly.
It was interesting to note that through this emergent process, the results took
shape in some different and unpredictable combinations. For instance, the possibility
existed that all institutions complied with every facet of the 2009 IOM Policy Report (Lo
& Field, 2009). Another possibility existed that almost all institutions complied with a
majority of policy recommendations and added more stringent COI policies. Finally, the
possibility existed that institutions would fall into two divergent categories of extremely
collaborative or extremely noncollaborative. Until the data were collected and analyzed,
one would not know or could not accurately predict the results of what was being studied.
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Data Analysis and Coding: Research Question 2
Analysis for this research question examined to what extent collaborative or
noncollaborative COI polices adopted by medical academic institutions had on research
funding placement by the pharmaceutical industry. Institutions were assigned the
definition of noncollaborative or collaborative in nature. A more complicated analysis
involved looking at institutions that evolved from being collaborative to noncollaborative
over the time period studied or vice versa. Again, through the data analysis I looked for
patterns of policy evolvement and a potential effect on research placement.
As the researcher, I remained objective and once again, made sure that my own
personal biases did not taint the process of deducing institutional motivation. For
example, when a examining a COI policy, one justification could be to control undue
influence and another could be concern about patient safety. These justifications would
have been coded and compared against each school interviewed. Again, this was an
emergent process and what was identified as having/not having a potential effect on
research funding was identifiable. That is, the data may have showed no similarity or
dissimilarity on any parameter, theme, or association to research funding placement
received by medical academic institutions.
Discrepant and Outlying Cases
The inclusion and discussion of discrepant cases was important with regard to
both validity and controlling for bias (Maxwell, 2005). With this mind, discrepant cases
were discussed and rationale for inclusion or de-selection in data analysis was provided.
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Typically data distribution in any study has a tendency to clump or regress to a midpoint.
It was possible that a particular case that was farthest from the norm could have actually
shown the highest correlation to the research questions being investigated. For example,
an institution that developed the most noncollaborative interaction policies compared to
other institutions might have had the most dramatic decrease in research funding.
Issues of Trustworthiness
Credibility
Researchers suggest that in order for a study to have credibility the actual findings
need to make sense to both the reader and people involved in the field of study (Miles &
Huberman, 1994). A process similar to triangulation was employed to accomplish this.
The responses from the interview were compared to the actual COI policies within an
institution. If the survey responses led one to believe the institution was very open and
collaborative in nature and the actual COI policy is very restrictive and noncollaborative
in nature, then the responses from the interviewee needed to be more closely scrutinized.
Transferability
The concept of transferability was important with regard to the potential
application across a broader sphere than the research itself (Miles & Huberman, 1994).
The study's findings were limited to medical academic institutions in the United States
engaged in medical research. With regard to transferability, the research might have
application to other countries that have medical academic universities. This would have
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to be applied with a cautious eye as other countries have different medical delivery
systems (private versus socialized) and regulatory environment.
Dependability
Miles and Huberman (1994) discuss dependability in terms of whether the
research process was stable, consistent over time, and the research questions are clearly
stated. Additionally, they contend that the investigators role and status within the context
of the study needs to be disclosed fully. The research questions were straightforward and
my role as the researcher already has already been discussed in terms of defining the
operational research terms and what I examined with regard to interaction and COI
policies. At such point that the data emerged from both the survey and interview portion
of the study, a determination of an institution being considered collaborative or
noncollaborative was assigned and objectivity was exercised during this process.
Confirmability
Confirmability was an important concept with regard to the researcher being
reasonably neutral and free from unacknowledged researcher bias (Miles & Huberman,
1994). Additionally, a study needs to be replicable from the standpoint that another
researcher could come in and repeat the study using the same methodology. This study
met these two criteria for a number of reasons. Full disclosure for a potential COI is
documented in Appendix A. A discussion of methods employed to remain as bias-free as
possible were also provided throughout the dissertation. From the replicability standpoint,
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the research design and methodology were provided throughout this chapter and in the
appendices. Finally, study data were retained and available for review upon request.
Ethical Procedures
Much of the information about interaction and COI policies was already a matter
of public record and provided by medical academic institutions. What is not readily
available, however, was an exact accounting of how many research dollars were placed at
medical academic centers. Public universities, however, are required to disclose this
information if requested under provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (United
States Department of Justice, 2013). One could argue that private institutions based on
the quantity of NIH awarded research grants and operational reimbursement through
Medicare (federal) and Medicaid (state) would also have to disclose the same
information. With that in mind, ethical issues surrounding data disclosure and reporting
for this portion of the study were really not an issue. My intent in this research, however,
was not to report research funding levels at the individual institution level and therefore
was not disclosed.
Ethical considerations were addressed with regard to survey and interview
information. Both the survey and interview were intended to elicit information about the
rationale and decision making with regard to the enactment of interaction and COI
policies. All information collected was de-identified and will remain confidential. The
intent of this was to solicit honest input that might otherwise be stifled if not left
confidential. After the initial completion of the study, all hard-copy (printed) data and
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electronic data were saved electronically via password protect computer hardware thumb
drive. All hard-copy (printed) confidential information will then be destroyed. After five
years, all confidential information stored via hard drive will be deleted.
Another ethical issue that required comment is my own bias as a result of a
potential COI because I am employed in the pharmaceutical industry. Discussed
numerous times during this dissertation proposal, I fully disclosed my financial interest in
the pharmaceutical industry. From an ethical perspective, it is important to discuss that
from the outset, my interest in the research topic was not to “prove a point” but rather to
more fully understand the entire topic and move the body of literature forward as it
pertains to the interface between academia and industry.
Summary
In this qualitative case study my purpose was intended to examine the extent and
similarity to which a sample of the 75 United States based medical academic universities
enacted COI policies and degree of compliance with the 2009 IOM's (Lo & Field, 2009)
recommendations and the potential implications of research funding placement by the
pharmaceutical industry. An initial letter of invitation and online survey was sent out to
these academic institutions requesting information about institutional COI development
and research placement by the pharmaceutical industry. A voluntary follow-up interview
of 10 academic centers was proposed to more fully understand this phenomenon. Actual
COI policies, research funding data, and interview information were coded and analyzed
to look for emergent patterns, themes and associations. I discuss the results of this
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research in Chapter 4 and the recommendations and implications are presented in Chapter
5.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
In Chapter 4, I investigate the extent to which medical academic institutions’
adopted interaction and COI policies are consistent with the 2009 IOM Policy Report (Lo
& Field, 2009) concerning healthcare professionals’ relationships with the
pharmaceutical industry. I also examine the potential effect that COI policy development
had on research funding placement by the pharmaceutical industry into medical
academia. The initial research plan was altered as numerous challenges with securing 10
institutional representative interviews were encountered. I evaluated 15 medical academic
centers respective COI policies in relationship to the 10 major policy recommendations
issued in the 2009 IOM Policy Report (Lo & Field, 2009). An administrator from four of
those institutions was interviewed to discuss general COI issues, relationships with the
pharmaceutical industry, and research funding by industry post 2009 IOM policy
recommendations.
Setting
The participants (n = 4) in the interview portion of this qualitative research were
all currently employed and in good active standing with the institutions they represented
at the time of the interview. Follow-up with these individuals to review interview
transcripts and clarify minor information items verified this situation as all participants
were readily available and not under duress during or after the interview process.
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Participants were interviewed in their respective office space via teleconference and at a
time that was convenient for them to complete the interview without time constraints.
Demographics
Demographic information with regards to this study is interesting in that the
research questions pertain to AAMC institutions that conduct medical research in the
United States. Of the 75 schools invited to participate, 42 were publicly funded and 33
were nonprofit private institutions. Administrators from four different institutions that
elected to participate in the interview portion of the study represented three public and
one private institution and had been with their respective institution for the last 6 to 9
years and had all been involved with COI issues since at least 2009. These
administrators’ functions with their institutions included one dean of medical school and
executive vice president for medical affairs, one associate dean for regulatory affairs, and
two directors, COI office/program. Five different administrators replied with initial
interest in being involved with the interview but were lost during the follow-up and
scheduling process. Ten institutions declined to participate in the study, and the
remaining 56 institutions did not reply to multiple queries via email, voicemail, or phone
call.
The total number medical academic institutions that had their current COI and
interactions with industry policies reviewed totaled 15 with nine being public and six
being private (nonprofit). This purposed selection process was intended to closely mirror
the mix of public and private institutions and included drawing schools from across the
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entire United States so as to prevent potential regional (geographic) tendencies. Of the 11
institutions that had their COI policies reviewed without a corresponding interview, six
had previously declined to be involved in the research and five were from the no reply
category.
Data Collection
Challenges With Data Collection
An invitation to participate in research was emailed to the medical director (dean)
of the medical school of the 75 identified AAMC institutions on three different occasions
consistent with the IRB application. This solicitation resulted in no survey responses,
with one institutional participant being interviewed, eight institutions declining to
participate, and the remaining 66 institutions not responding to the three research
invitations. The research plan was altered to study publicly available COI policies via
the internet and a new invitation to participate in research was emailed to a director of
research and/or director of COI office and yielded one interview and two institutions
declining to participate. Two interviews were scheduled as a result of telephone calls
placed to the director of research and/or director of COI offices. The challenge with
securing interviews was extremely time consuming, and it was decided to use an n = 4 as
opposed to the initially planned n = 10. It was centrally frustrating that through all three
processes employed to solicit interviews (study participants), a nonresponse from
potential research candidates was most common. Many reasons could explain why such a
low response rate occurred, but one potential explanation is that I was forthright in my
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identification of working in the pharmaceutical industry and a bias for noncontact
(nonengagement) with industry may have been present. On three separate occasions, I
was told that my research invitation would be forwarded to a schools legal counsel and
they would get back in touch with me if they were interested. Multiple times, phone
messages were left without return phone calls or I was asked to email or reemail an
invitation to participate in research and no follow-on response from a potential
interviewee occurred.
Overall Data Collection Plan Altered
Based on the challenges with securing interested parties to participate in research,
an alternative data collection plan was instituted. The initial data collection plan would
have involved an n = 10 for both the institutional review of current COI policies and the
corresponding interview of an administrator. This was altered to increase the number of
institutions COI policies to be reviewed to be increased to an n = 15 and the number of
institutions with an interviewed representative being decreased to an n = 4. The rationale
behind this was to be able to compare and contrast the COI policies of interviewed
institutions against noninterviewed institutions. That is, if COI policy was generally
consistent between interviewed and noninterviewed institutions, a reasonable parallel
could be drawn. While this may be somewhat of a stretch with regard to credibility and
transferability, the intention was to in some fashion be able to examine n = 4 (interviewed
and policy review) to n = 11 (policy review only) and still be able to have the study
potentially apply to the 75 AAMC schools that conduct medical research. This situation
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helps explain and potentially justifies why a qualitative design for this research was
warranted. Essentially, an emergent process with regard to qualitatively based research
warranted increasing the n from the COI policy data sources in an attempt to
accommodate for the decrease in the n of institutional interviews performed. Other than
the central challenge of finding study participants, there were no unusual circumstances
that occurred during the data collection process.
Interview Data Collection
The individual participants were all interviewed using the interview questions
provided in Appendix D. Each interview was started with me introducing myself and
explaining my purpose for the research and the disclosure that I work for Pfizer
Pharmaceuticals. I spent a couple of minutes reviewing my interest in the topic itself and
that I was not trying to purpose my research as a means to call for COI policy reversals.
The duration of these interviews ranged from 47 minutes to 1 hour, 7 minutes and was
recorded using a digital recording device. A transcribed typed interview transcript was
provided to each participant for review. Interviewees were allowed to clarify and/or
change their answers accordingly for accuracy and context purposes. Any revisions were
minor in nature and still allowed for genuine and nonguarded answers. My introduction
to the topic and the interviewees’ ability to review transcripts post interview yielded
honest and insightful answers.
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COI Policy Data Collection
To answer the central research question about the extent to which United States
based medical institution have adopted COI policies consistent with the IOM Policy
Report (Lo & Field, 2009), a review of current COI policies was initiated. When starting
the review of these policies, it was determined that the IOM policy recommendations
were usually housed in two separate policies. The first policy was usually titled a COI,
Financial COI, or COI in Medical Research policy and the second was an Interaction
with Industry or Vendor Relations policy. A third type of policy entitled COI in CME
was also present at some schools. The range of the number of institutional policies and/or
policy links (online policy subset) that governed institutional COI issues was one to 16
with an average of 6.7 policies/links per school.
The four institutions that had a representative interviewed provided or had
available on-line their current policies and their respective COI Policies ranged from a
current version date of 2012 to 2014 with an average late 2012 date and the Vendor
Policies ranging from 2009 to 2013 with an average 2011 date. Eleven institutions
purposely selected had their policies accessed via the Internet with their COI Policies
ranging from 2010 to 2014 with an average 2012 date and the Vendor Policies ranging
from 2009 to 2014 with an average 2012 date. It is important to note that all of these
policies were put in place since the release of the 2009 IOM Policy report and would
seem to indicate that interaction and COI policies at the medical academic center level
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are actively monitored and updated. This is in contrast to findings of previous authors
that prior to 2009, COI policies were nonexistent, lax, or not enforced (Maahs, 2012).
The process to collect elements from these policies and capture them in relation to
the 2009 IOM Policy Report involved building a grid with the institution recorded on the
y-axis and the policy recommendation displayed on the x-axis (Appendix H). This
allowed me to visualize and summarize all 15 institutions across 10 policy
recommendations. This is discussed in further detail in the data analysis section.
Data Analysis
COI Policy Analysis – Coding and Themes
The review of institutional COI policies in relation to the 2009 IOM Report was
not as simple as a yes or no proposition by specific policy recommendation. For instance,
the 2009 IOM Report specifically called on institutions to ban all free meals provided by
industry. Of the 15 institutions’ policies reviewed, only four institutions specifically
prohibited all free meals, and one allowed free meals with a $5.00 per person limit. The
remaining 10 institutions prohibited free meals, but with four different types of
exceptions allowed. From this, a data analysis approach using a spectrum was employed
with each policy recommendation being assigned 10 points and an emergent process of
coding (scoring) each individual institution’s own policies against each recommendation.
That said, the only preset codes with regard to per-policy analysis was that if a policy
completely conformed with the policy, it was assigned 10 points and a policy that did not
confirm was assigned 0 points. An emergent coding process was then employed to
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capture range of conformity in between these opposite ends and was coded (scored)
between 2 to 9 points. Each institution’s adherence (coded and scored) to the IOM Policy
Report by all 10 recommendations was then added together to arrive at a possible
spectrum score of 0 to 100 points. It is important to note that this process was emergent,
was qualitatively based, and was not intended to absolutely score “percent compliance”
to IOM Policy Report. This was done to arrive at some form of measurement to examine
overall compliance to the IOM’s policy recommendations by institution and compare and
contrast each different IOM policy recommendation to each school’s policy as well.
Institutions studied were placed on the y-axis and each IOM Policy recommendation was
placed on the x-axis. The summary institution versus policy recommendation and
corresponding coding (scoring) is detailed in Appendix H. The coding (scoring) process
by comparing institutional policy to IOM Policy Report is provided as follows:
1.

Board-level involvement at the individual institution level to develop
comprehensive COI policy. Category scored yes =10 points, across all
institutions. Depth of individual institution policies as well as adherence to
IOM Policy Report recommendations 2 through 10 demonstrated broad policy
coverage and development of comprehensive COI policy by all 15 institutions
studied.

2. Researchers should not be involved in research on human subjects if they have
a financial interest in the outcome unless researcher expertise is vital to the
safe conduct of the research itself. Category scored yes-managed = 6 points,
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across all institutions. No single institution completely adhered to this policy.
This recommendation became very highly regulated through COI committees,
review processes, management plans, Office of Research Integrity
involvement, and IRB involvement. Participant 103 articulated this by stating,
“We completely disagree with IOM as pertains to research. Industry contacts
the experts and that is how research gets placed”. Participant 103 elaborated
further by explaining that having a PI that has a consulting agreement with
industry creates greater transparency because it is disclosed, managed, and
monitored by the institution. In application, this policy recommendation was
more practically replaced by the NIH in 2011 when rules governing COI in
research was issued (NIH, 2011). This is discussed further in the results
section.
3. Ban faculty from receiving any gifts from industry. Category scored yes = 10
points; yes –medical textbooks allowed = 8 points; no -- $5.00 per meal and
$75.00 per company per year limit = 2 points. While allowing a medical
textbook may appear as a major loophole within this policy domain, the
actuality of its occurrence is very uncommon as industry has highly gravitated
away from this practice.
4. Prohibit faculty from involvement in industry speaker bureaus. Category
scored yes = 10 points; no--non promotional speaking only = 5 points; no-discouraged but not prohibited = 6 points; no = 0 points. The practice of
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nonpromotional speaking (nonproduct) on a general disease state is highly
unused by industry. The real effect of allowing this was very minimal and was
discussed by Participants 101, 102, and 103. The practice of discouraging the
practice of industry speaker bureaus but not prohibiting entirely them was
consistent with the policy and interview of Participant 105 and their
institutions’ policy. Essentially, due to the heightened awareness due to COI
issues the largest majority of faculty no longer participated in speaker bureaus.
5. Prohibit faculty from claiming authorship for ghost-written articles. Category
scored yes = 10 points across all institutions. This category was very fairly
simple to code (score) as all institutions had straightforward language dealing
with this policy recommendation. An example provided by Institution 101
policy stated, “(School) prohibits faculty, trainees, and students from allowing
their professional presentations of any kind, oral or written, to be ghostwritten
(i.e., written by someone who is not an author) by any party, industry or
otherwise.”
6. Prohibit the provision of free meals from industry. Category scored yes = 10
points; yes--CME events allowed though = 8 points; yes--off site only if
sponsored by industry = 8 points; yes-on site or off site only if sponsored by
industry = 7 points; yes--holiday snacks allowed = 8 points; no--$5.00 per
meal with $75.00 per company per year limit = 2 points. This category was
the most problematic to code (score) as the provision to allow free meals in

88
conjunction with CME events might appear to ignore this policy
recommendation. CME events usually occur during “Grand Rounds” where a
faculty member provides a presentation in a lecture hall during lunch or an
off-site CME event where industry sponsorships for the event are common to
defray the cost of the CME event for the individual attendee. In either case,
these types of activities when they do occur are highly regulated by both
academia and industry. For instance, it is common in the pharmaceutical
industry for companies to allow representatives to attend CME events, but
representatives are not allowed to wear name tags, engage in promotional
information, or provide food. For off-site CME programs, industry is allowed
display space, but it is required to be in a separate room from the CME
activity itself. Institutions that allowed a provision for on-site or off-site meals
further created potential confusion on this topic as it could refer to CME
events and/or non CME promotional events. As these institutions were not
interviewed, it could not be determined what the actual policy meant. The
reality is that with regard to the provision of free meals, the common practice
of industry representatives bringing food for product discussions and inservices has been largely eliminated. Coupling this policy with the
recommendation of restricting representative access to medical academic
centers (see recommendation eight) confirms that this previous practice has
primarily ended.
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7. Prohibit faculty from entering into consulting arrangements not recognized for
expert services at fair market value. Category scored yes=10 points; no=0
points. This policy recommendation was expressed by Participant 102 by
stating, “We developed policy on consulting with the bio-medical industry
that allows for consulting provided there are specific deliverables that they
have to provide”. Policy language around this topic discussed reporting,
monitoring, enforcement, and compliance NIH reporting rules (NIH, 2011).
8. Restrict pharmaceutical sales representative access to medical academic
centers. Category scored yes=10 points; no-managed=6 points. This category
typically included language about representatives only being allowed access
to an institution if they had a prior scheduled appointment and representatives
having to sign-in at a specific location. This mechanism created a highly
restrictive environment at some institutions because the cultural norm was for
faculty and staff to not schedule appointments and email communication from
a pharmaceutical representative could be “firewalled” by IT as spam and not
be delivered. Participant 105 addressed this issue by stating, “We don’t have
pharmaceutical representatives coming in and meeting with our faculty to talk
about the latest pain medication. It just isn’t going to happen”.
9. Restrict medication samples to only economically challenged patients.
Category scored yes=10 points; yes-no samples allowed at all=10 points;
unknown=2 points; no=0 points. This category was interesting as a majority
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of institutions actually banned samples completely. This once common
practice as a means for representatives to talk to physicians and staff while
providing medication samples and those samples being used for a patient
medication start has become almost nonexistent in the medical academic
hospital setting. It could be observed, however, that the elimination of samples
almost had equally to do with hospital accreditation requirements dealing with
sample secured storage, documentation, dispensing, and inventory
requirements.
10. Separate CME activities from industry influence. Category scored yes=10
points; no-managed=6 points, unknown=2 points; no=0 points. This policy
category fell to a highly managed environment with many CME activities
being reported, documented, managed, and approved through a COI Office.
For instance, Participant 103 elaborated on this topic by talking about a
request they received to attend a CME event and after a full review of the
activity agenda it was determined that the majority of the time (trip) was not
being spent on continuing education and the request to attend the event was
not allowed.
Several different data manipulations were done to look for patterns, themes, and
discrepant cases. The coding grid provided in Appendix H was used and examined all 15
institutions in summary, interviewed versus noninterviewed institutions, publicly versus
privately funded academic centers, and least number of COI policies to most number of
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COI policies reported/available to review. Patterns by these demographic categories were
observed as well as patterns within each policy recommendation as well. This is
presented fully in the results section.
COI Interview Analysis – Coding and Theme Development
The four participants interviewed provided their input as it pertains to their
respective institutions COI policy development, management, and adherence. The openended nature of the questions provided the interviewees a forum to share their insights
that were most topical to them. No two interviews took on the same shape or content,
however, some very interesting themes, associations, and disassociations became
apparent when coding the interviews for themes accordingly. Some of the questions
presented more direct theme alignment while other questions elicited thought and opinion
that produced various themes throughout the interview. For instance, the interview
question with regard to the positive and negative aspects of working with industry
elicited responses fairly close to topic while the question with regard to opinion about the
IOM Policy recommendations being justified and why yielded responses that went in a
number of different directions.
The process to analyze these interviews followed a grounded and narrative analysis
approach (Hesse-Biber, 2010). Each interview was examined by preset topics (themes)
based on the interview questions. All interviews were coded within these topics to allow
for themes, patterns, similarities, and discrepancies between/among interview participants
to emerge. I typically read interview transcripts four or five times to look for further
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context and clarity in addition to codes from each topic were then also cross referenced.
This process could be best described as spiraling up and down the data as well as across
it. This was intentionally done in the classic “by hand” approach as opposed to using
computer software. To properly analyze the interview transcripts, an innate knowledge of
the research topic was required and the contextual meaning of what the interviewee’s was
communicating required deductive methodology. The preset topics for analyzing and
coding are provided below:
1.

Function with institution prior to 2009 IOM Policy Report and current
function with institution.

2. Familiarity with 2009 IOM Policy Report, justification, and institutional
policy changes made.
3. Institution’s current policy and how it addresses concerns from the 2009 IOM
Policy report.
4. Describe current relationship with pharmaceutical industry.
5. Positive aspects of working with the pharmaceutical industry.
6. Negative aspects of working with the pharmaceutical industry.
7. Medical research funding sources from and how much of it is from the
pharmaceutical industry.
8. Changes in COI policy and impact on pharmaceutical funding placement.
9. Other changes within institution and impact on pharmaceutical funding
placement.
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10. State or federal legislation that has impacted COI policy.
11. COI Policy enforcement.
A coding to themes tree is provided in Appendix I. Some participants provided
information that directly applied to each preset theme while some interviewees did not.
This approach, while somewhat cumbersome, made sense from the standpoint that many
times what an interviewee “said” had to be translated to” in-context meaning”.
The second approach to coding emerged in that themes produced from the preset
coding process, produced additional approaches to examine the data. This, in addition to
“open reading” of the interview transcripts produced additional themes to analyze. This
process could be best described as contextual data sifting. For instance, Participant 102
articulated several times during the interview about how the culture of medical schools
has changed dramatically in its’ interactions with industry as a result of COI policies.
Within the nuances of the interview, this participant indirectly refers to this theme as a
result of faculty and institution change in behavior not only from policy development, but
from individual and institutional sensitivity and awareness as well. Additionally,
Participant 105 did not mention “cultural change” directly in their interview, but did talk
about it in reference to a previous practice of the pharmaceutical industry providing
stethoscopes with a medication name on it by stating, “They didn’t want the swag
anymore (referring to medical students). They bought their own because they didn’t want
to be tainted.” This comment speaks to a profound cultural change at medical academic
centers in that what was once a common and accepted practice is now shunned. That said,
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both participants articulated a very direct change in behavior by their physicians and staff
relative to accepted/not accepted behavior. The emergent codes to themes approach tree
is detailed in Appendix I. A full discussion of this is provided in the results section and
the emergent codes to themes are provided below:
1. Negative Perception of Pharmaceutical Industry.
2. Positive Perception of Pharmaceutical Industry.
3. Role of Academia in Pharmaceutical Research.
4. Speaker Bureaus.
5. Institution and Individual Cultural Shift with Regard to Industry Contact.
6. Better Research.
7. Collaboration.
8. NIH Reporting Rules and Impact on Research Funding.
9. Institutional Challenges with IRB Efficiency.
Evidence of Trustworthiness
Credibility
As I discussed in Chapter 3, credibility can be a challenge with ensuring the
actual results are logical to the reader and those in the field of study (Miles & Huberman,
1994). I accounted for this by comparing the interview responses by institution to the
actual institution policies of that representative institution. Each interview was read in
comparison to each institution’s policies looking for consistency and discrepancies. For
instance, many interviewees reported that their institution banned faculty from
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participating in industry sponsored speaker bureaus. In every case, this was consistent to
the corresponding policy reviewed. Additionally, while many institutions went with a
more conservative approach to medication samples than the IOM Policy Report (Lo &
Field, 2009) by completely banning samples, it is logical as a course of action when
thinking about both potential COI policies as well as the compounding issue of hospitalbased reporting requirements with regard to sample storage, inventory, and dispensing
information.
Transferability
With regard to transferability, I altered the research data collection plan in a good
faith effort to have the results from this study have a broader application beyond the four
institutions that were interviewed and policies evaluated. As discussed earlier, the means
to purposely select eleven additional schools to have their policies reviewed without a
respective interview and then have those schools policies compared to the four schools
with interviews was used as a bridge. It was interesting to observe that from a policy
perspective, all 15 schools with or without regard to being interviewed, were very similar
in the their policies adopted post 2009 IOM Policy report. It can be argued that because
only four institutions are represented from interviews, this particular research is
challenged with regard transferability to all 75 AAMC institutions that conduct medical
research.
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Dependability
The research process was consistent during the time of this study in that the
interview process from candidate to candidate was not altered. This consistency was
demonstrated in the relatively similar amount of time it took for each interview and the
overall lack of interview corrections or clarifications requested by the interviewee. The
interviewees demonstrated dependability as a source of information with regard to time in
position at their respective institution and their knowledge of COI issues as demonstrated
by their ability to talk about the topic in depth and with relative ease. When the general
research topic was introduced to interviewees, it was easily understood and topical to
their functional area at their institution. The research question in relation to individual
institution policy development versus the 2009 IOM Policy Report recommendations
made data analysis straightforward. The research question with regard to exact research
funding levels was more nuanced in that most schools did not have an exact research
funding number to report by the pharmaceutical industry. This will be discussed further
in the Results section.
Confirmability
Based on the methodology and my upfront disclosure of working in the
pharmaceutical industry, issues with regard to potential researcher bias have been
disclosed and managed. Mentioned earlier, my description of the purpose of the study to
interviewees helped elicit honest and genuine answers. With regard to general
replicability, this study could be repeated if desired and the study data will be retained
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and available for the next five years. It would be interesting to see if this research was
repeated by someone within medical academia what challenges (or lack thereof) with
enrolling interview participants in this study would occur.
Results: Research Question 1
Since the release of the IOM Policy Report (Lo & Field, 2009), to what extent
have interaction and COI policies been fully complied with by United States based
medical academic institutions, what were the rationale(s) and decision making
considerations involved in developing such policies, and how would these institutions
classify the current nature of their relationship with pharmaceutical companies as
opposed to pre 2009?
Discussion
The policy analysis of 15 medical academic institutions overall showed at high
rate of compliance to the 2009 IOM COI recommendations. Individual institutions were
coded (scored) across all 10 2009 IOM policy recommendations with a possible total
compliance score being 100. This process is depicted in Table 3 and displays each
institution on the first column with scoring by IOM policy recommendation along each
corresponding column and a total compliance score reported in the last column.
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Table 3
IOM policy recommendation compliance scoring by institution.
Instit.

IOM Policy Recommendation
10

Total

0

6

80

10

10

96

10

6

90

10

0

79

10

2

6

64

10

10

6

90

10

10

0

4

75

10

10

10

10

6

92

8

10

10

6

6

86

10

8

10

10

10

0

84

10

7

10

10

2

0

65

10

10

10

10

6

0

6

78

10

10

8

10

10

10

6

90

8

10

10

10

10

10

10

0

84

8

0

10

8

10

10

10

0

72

9.1

8.1

10

8

10

9.7

6.7

4.1

81.7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

101

10

6

10

10

102

10

6

10

10

10

8

10

10

10

10

10

10

103

10

6

10

104

10

6

10

10

10

8

10

10

5

10

8

10

10

105

10

6

106

10

6

2

6

10

2

10

10

10

10

8

10

107

10

6

8

10

10

7

108

10

109

10

6

10

10

10

6

10

10

10

110
111

10

6

10

10

10

6

10

0

112

10

6

10

113

10

6

10

114

10

6

115

10

6

Ave

10

6

9

The data were examined across a number of arrays and resulted in similar yet
interesting results reported on Table 4 with regard to interviewed versus not interviewed
institutions, public versus private, and most versus least policy links categories by
institution.
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Table 4
IOM compliance score across different identifiers
Category

n=

Range

x̅

Median

All Institutions

15

64-96

81.7

82.0

Interviewed
Not Interviewed

4
11

64-96
65-90

82.5
81.4

85.0
84.0

Public
Private

9
6

64-96
65-90

82.1
81.2

80.0
85.0

Most Policy Links
Least Policy Links

7
8

84-96
64-90

87.6
76.5

90.0
78.5

While somewhat unorthodox to the typical qualitative process, the data analysis
approach and presentation of the results in relationship to institutional compliance with
the 2009 IOM Policy report shows relatively high compliance and similarity between and
among different demographic categories of the institutions researched in this study. The
range of compliance score from 64 - 96 (xˉ = 81.7) suggests that policy recommendations
across all institutions shifted along a normal distribution spectrum. That is, a couple of
institutions very highly complied with the IOM Policy report recommendations (n = 2,
score over 90) and a couple of institutions complied fairly well (n = 2, score under 70). It
was interesting to observe that interviewed versus noninterviewed institutions had an x ̅
compliance score of 82.5 and 81.4 respectively and public versus private institutions had
an xˉ compliance score of 82.1 and 81.2 respectively. At a macro-level, these results
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would seem to suggest that medical academic centers adopted policy changes generally
consistent with the 2009 IOM Policy Report.
The segmentation of the institutions with the most policy links versus the least
policy links did show some differentiation in that the schools with most policy links (n =
7) had an xˉ compliance score of 87.6 and the schools with least policy links (n = 8) had
an xˉ compliance score of 76.5. This is not a profound observation in that it would seem
to make sense that schools that had developed the most number of policy links (number
of policies) would have developed policy language to more fully deal with COI issues.
Therefore, it could be generally observed that schools with higher levels of COI policy
development had compliance scores that were closer in alignment to the IOM’s policy
recommendations.
Within the parameters of each policy recommendation, some interesting themes
emerged. All fifteen medical academic centers enacted policy that was comprehensive in
nature, prohibited ghost writing practices, and allowed for consulting contracts at a fair
market value and 14 of 15 medical schools restricted industry representative access to
their respective campuses. Outside of these policy domains, the level of compliance and
similarity among institutions varied by category and are discussed below.
Higher Compliance Versus Lower Compliance
Institution 105 was the school with the lowest compliance score of 64 and had a
representative interviewed for this study. Participant 105 talked about some of the
challenges this institution had with regard to COI policy development in that they were
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trying to administer policy across four different campuses that varied between being
highly medically oriented versus being more engineering oriented at other campuses.
They stated that they felt they had more work to do with COI policy development and
that the language was stale and had not kept up with the way academia and industry were
doing things. They did, however, talk in terms that while the policy language was
somewhat challenged, the institution essentially “massaged” the policies to work to arrive
at compliance within the spirit of the IOM’s policy recommendations and to comply with
NIH reporting rules. Institution 111 had a compliance score of 65 and a representative
from this institution was not interviewed for this study. Therefore, the means to more
fully examine institutional motivation and decision making with regard to COI policy
development and enforcement was not possible. It is interesting to note, however, that
this is an institution that has historically has had very profitable industry partnerships
with regard to medicine development.
Institution 102 had the highest compliance score of 96 and had an administrator
interviewed for this research. Participant 102 discussed their institution’s comprehensive
approach to COI issues with three different committees involved in COI matters and
additionally stated that, “People are sensitized to the issue of their engagement with
industry and what that engagement might have on research, clinical care, and medical
education.” They also discussed policy development about banning industry speaker
bureaus and COI policy education for faculty and staff. It is interesting to note that this
institution was the only one to completely separate industry and CME activities (IOM
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recommendation 10) of the 15 institutions studied. Of the administrators interviewed, this
participant was the only to mention CME and discussed it in terms of banning receipt of
any payments from industry for this activity. Institution 108 had the next highest
compliance score of 92 and was not interviewed for this study. Again, without this
vehicle to capture institutional motivation and decision making rationale, a more full
analysis was not possible. It is interesting to note, however, that this institution did have a
significant financial COI scandal during the 2000s when it was exposed that an
influential faculty member had received millions of dollars from the pharmaceutical
industry for speaking and consulting services. This institution also segmented into the
higher policy links category with nine policies available for review.
Samples
The IOM Policy Report recommendation with regard to providing samples only
to those patients who were economically challenged was split between eight institutions
completely eliminating samples, three institutions that continued to allow samples
without regard to economic status, two with a sample policy unknown, one with a
managed process, and one that followed the IOM’s policy recommendation. Within this
policy domain, over half implemented policy that was more restrictive than the IOM’s
recommendations. Mentioned earlier, an equally compounding issue around sample
regulations in a hospital setting with regard to storage, record keeping, dispensing, and
inventories may have had a larger effect on this than just the IOM policy
recommendation. Outside this issue, there was no real consistency among institutions and
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this policy domain. Participant 105 was the only interviewee to mention samples in a
passing comment about needing to address this further in a way that would be consistent
with a formulary committee review.
Prohibiting Gifts
This policy recommendation was highly adhered to with 11 institutions
prohibiting the receipt of gifts from industry. One institution allowed gifts with a $5.00
limit per gift and no more than $75.00 in gifts per company per year. Three institutions
allowed a provision for faculty to receive a medical textbook from industry. This
particular loophole was probably more of a holdover from the 1990s to 2000s when this
was a common practice. This practice has been largely eliminated by industry today.
Prohibiting Food
Policy development with regard to the recommendation of prohibiting food to
faculty and staff was adopted with a number of exceptions that still generally restricted a
once very common practice. Four institutions banned food outright and six institutions
allowed meals, but only if provided in conjunction with a CME event. As CME events
are highly regulated and do not occur on a daily basis (even weekly at some institutions),
the real effect of this highly eliminated meals being provided industry. Three institutions
allowed meals within the function of being “industry sponsored”, but this could be
interpreted as part of a CME event, conference, or speaker program. One institution
allowed holiday snacks and one school allowed meals under the provision of a $5.00 per
meal and $75.00 per company per year policy.
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Continuing Medical Education
This particular policy recommendation was the least adhered to as the IOM
sought to separate any industry involvement with CME activities. Only one institution
adopted this policy outright and five institutions did not follow this recommendation.
Eight schools elected to maintain CME support/involvement from industry, but in a
managed way typically with approval to be provided by a COI office or committee. One
institution did not specifically address CME in its policy, but language around
consistency with ACCME standards was mentioned.
Speaker Bureaus
The particular policy recommendation to ban faculty from participation in
industry speaker bureaus could best be described as a lightning bolt topic. All four
interviewees mentioned this in their respective interviews as a major issue. Participant
101 when speaking about COI issues in general stated, “Fundamentally, it was about
speaking engagements that were not CME related...with slide decks that were prepared
by industry and this created the potential appearance of buying the faculty member.”
They went on to elaborate that this practice constituted large transfers of money upwards
of hundreds of thousands of dollars paid to faculty per year and instituting policy to
prohibit this activity was initially met with resistance. Participant 101 further stated, “We
had two people that were recalcitrant, didn’t see the value of the policies and engaged in
relationships without disclosing them. They were discovered and they were terminated.”
Participant 103 added, “We had one situation were a faculty member was cancelling
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clinic all the time and was probably tripling his salary and we didn’t know quite how to
control it.” This institution also prohibited the practice of allowing faculty to participate
in industry speaker bureaus.
Of the four institutions interviewed, three prohibited speaker bureau involvement
and one discouraged, but did not prohibit speaking for industry. Four of the institutions
studied continued to allow faculty to be involved in speaker bureaus, but were not
interviewed during this study. The remaining institutions did not allow speaking for
industry.
Principal Investigator (PI) and Financial Ties to Industry
The IOM specifically sought to prohibit PIs from having any financial ties to
industry unless the safe conduct of the research trial in question required the expertise of
that particular PI. No school specifically banned this practice and sought to manage this
process through disclosure, reporting, oversight, management plans, and COI office
and/or COI committee involvement. This policy was largely trumped by a different
recommendation that came out of the IOM Report (Lo & Field, 2009) that specifically
called on the government to more fully legislate COI issues in medicine from a
disclosure, reporting, and management perspective. In August 2011, the NIH made a
number of rule changes to the previous COI policy rules issued in 1995 (2011). In order
for an institution to continue to receive NIH funding, individual researchers were
required to disclose to their respective institutions all significant financial interests related
to their organization with the annual monetary threshold reduced from $10,000 to $5,000.
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The NIH also required that institutions provide reporting on COI to include policy,
management, and institutional training to researchers (NIH, 2011). The change in the
NIH rule was mentioned by all four interview participants as a major turning point in
COI policy development as the reporting burden shifted from the individual researcher to
the institution itself. Previous to this rule change, most financial ties between individual
faculty and industry were under reported or not disclosed at all. Participant 105 probably
summed it up best by stating, “It was probably the biggest thing I have seen happen in 15
years I have been in compliance…It switched from manage conflicts and tell us if you
have a potential issue to here’s how you are going to do it.”
Relationship With Industry
The results from the policy and interview analysis demonstrated a general
nonengagement with industry unless specifically for the purpose of conducting research.
This was ferreted out not much by what was said, but more from what was not said.
Potential emergent themes from the interviews around collaboration, industry partner,
industry resources (information) for faculty, resources for patients, new medical
information, new medicine (drug) information, were highly absent. This is not surprising
when examining how COI policy was developed as an overall means to restrict
interactions between industry and faculty and staff. Participant 105 directly stated, “Our
institution, like many others, has locked the doors to that type of activity. We don’t have
pharma reps coming in and meeting with our faculty to talk about the latest pain
medication. It just isn’t going happen.” This interviewee redirected their answer and
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further stated, “On the flip side, we are really trying to bolster working with industry on
the research process.” This attitude was highly prevalent across all interviews as there
was a desire to interact with industry, but only to the extent that it was tied to research
and research funding.
Results: Research Question 2
What are some of the effects that new COI policies have had on pharmaceutical
industry research funding for United States based medical academic institutions since the
implementation of the IOM Report (Lo & Field, 2009)?
Discussion
Research funding placement by the pharmaceutical industry into individual
medical academic centers is not information that was publicly available during the
research timeline. Provisions of the PPSA (Sunshine Act) from 2010 required industry to
report all institutional and individual financial ties in medicine and only began to come
online during 2014 (American Medical News, 2013). Therefore, answering Research
Question 2 was not as easy as looking at previous research funding reports and examining
those placements against individual institution COI policy development. Knowing this
limitation, the information provided from the interviews produced some insightful and
interesting results.
Research Funding
Nearly one-third of research funding provided to medical academic centers was
NIH based (Dorsey et al., 2010) and was fairly consistent with information the four
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interviewees provided. However, one Participant 102 reported that of their $500 million
annual research budget, around $300 million of it came from the NIH. It makes sense that
based on quantity and percentage of research money from the NIH, medical academic
centers would be financially motivated to stay in line with NIH reporting rules and is why
this was such a big topic within the realm of COI policy development, reporting, and
enforcement. The NIH rule was mentioned numerous times during the participant
interviews.
Funding provided by industry for medical academic centers research efforts
averaged around 10% for the institutions interviewed. Participant 105 (institution
compliance score = 64) actually reported the lowest percentage of pharmaceutical
research at 6%. Participant 101 (institution compliance score = 80) reported the highest
percentage of industry research placement at around $30 million and total research
budget of $150 million at 20%. Participant 102 reported a total research budget of $500
million per year with industry support ranging anywhere from $50-$100 million per year.
COI Policy Development and Potential Effect Pharmaceutical Research Placement
The centrally defining question to this study presented to interview participants
was whether or not COI policy development at their institution affected research
placement by the pharmaceutical industry. The answer to this question was answered
directly and indirectly throughout the interviews accordingly.
Participant 101 directly stated, “Overall our changes in COI policy did not impact
research placement. Actually our funding has gone up as a result of investments in
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infrastructure and adding faculty…We were very interested in speeding up IRB
approvals, master contracts, and trying to make the process easier.” Participant 101 went
on to elaborate that as an institution they encourage faculty to be involved in research,
engage with industry to do so, and feel their institution is well suited for Phase I and II
clinical research. These comments are important as this institution had a compliance
score of 80 (middle of entire group), but had a higher than average industry placement of
research as a percentage of its total budget (20%).
Participant 102 answered, “I don’t think the policies we adopted have really had
an effect on research placement by the pharmaceutical industry…The bigger factor has
been the regulatory (NIH rule) and IRB process involved.” Participant 102 further shared
that the pharmaceutical industry has not been impressed at long it to get research through
the contracting and IRB process and that they felt academia wide, institutions were
looking for ways to be more competitive and reduce turn-around time. This institution
had the highest compliance score of 96 and the largest total research budget (all sources)
of institutions at around $500 million.
Participant 103 stated, “We did have a big downturn…we were not sure if it was
the economy or our strict interaction policies.” Participant 103 did elaborate further that
the reduction in research placement was largely a function of leadership that put
restrictive policies in place and now with some current changes in leadership, has added
new faculty, is looking to speed up the IRB process with weekly meetings, and has made
a deliberate attempt to secure new research. This person also added that the NIH
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reporting rules dramatically impacted their approach to COI issues and interaction with
industry. This institution had a policy compliance score of 90 (upper third).
Participant 105 stated, “I don’t get a real sense of our policy effecting research
placement either way.” Participant 105 did mention several times throughout the
interview that the NIH Reporting Rule, while justified, dramatically changed their
approach to COI issues but that did not necessarily have direct tie to funding placement.
It is interesting to note that while this institution had the lowest policy compliance score
it also had the lowest percentage of research placement (6%) by the pharmaceutical
industry as a part of its total research budget.
The very apparent theme that presented itself with regard to these interviews was
that COI policy development in response to AAMC/IOM guidelines largely did not
impact research placement by the pharmaceutical industry. It is apparent, however, that
from the perspective of these institutions, the NIH Reporting Rule and the institutional
IRB process did have an impact on research placement. Consider Institution 101 were
research funding levels went up as a result of not being bogged down the NIH reporting
rule, streamlining the IRB process, adding infrastructure (IT), and adding faculty.
Contrast this to Institution 103 that reported a down-turn in pharmaceutical research
funding and attributed it the NIH Reporting Rule and restrictive COI policies. This
medical school has since made some institutional changes with regard to relaxing
portions of their institutional COI policy, adding faculty with interest in doing research,
and speeding up the IRB process.
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Summary
The results from this study show that medical academic centers were highly
compliant in their adherence to the recommendations presented in the 2009 IOM Policy
Report (Lo & Field, 2009) based on both a policy analysis of 15 institutions’ COI policies
and interviews with administrators of four of those institutions. Additionally, based on
the interviews conducted, medical academia appeared to be very nonengaged in
interactions with industry unless it was tied to research funding. The interviews contained
an in-depth discussion on COI policy development, process, reporting, and management,
but lacked genuine interest in collaboration or finding out about new medications. While
limited to interview data, the development of comprehensive COI policies by academic
centers has generally not had an impact on research placement by the pharmaceutical
industry. It can be observed though, that institutions that were better equipped from an
infrastructure perspective to effectively and efficiently speed up IRB processes and be
compliant with NIH reporting rules were better poised to secure funding than other
institutions. I present recommendations with regard to COI issues, industry engagement,
and research placement in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
The research findings I present in Chapter 5 employs an analysis of AAMC
institutional policy (n = 15) and administrator interviews (n = 4) to examine COI policy
development using the ACF construct. I investigated the extent to which AAMC
institutions adhered to the 2009 IOM Policy Report (Lo & Field, 2009) with regard to
COI policy development and potential effect on research funding placement by the
pharmaceutical industry. Two key findings emerged through policy and interview
reviews during the data collection and analysis phase of this research. The first key
finding is that AAMC institutions highly complied with the recommendations presented
in the 2009 IOM Policy Report (Lo & Field, 2009) with regard to COI policy
development, reporting, and adherence. The second key finding is that COI policy
development did not appear to effect research funding placement by the pharmaceutical
industry into medical academia. It appears, however, that a larger phenomenon
surrounding an institution’s capacity to comply with new NIH reporting requirements,
streamline IRB processes, and directionally align and engage in research was observed
with regard to research placement by industry into academia.
Interpretation of the Findings
The findings from this study establish that United States based AAMC institutions
that engage in medical research highly complied with the 2009 IOM Policy Report (Lo &
Field, 2009) recommendations with regard to COI policy development, management, and
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adherence. These findings did not suggest a link between COI policy development and an
effect on research placement by the pharmaceutical industry into medical academic
centers but rather a more complicated set of circumstances surrounding NIH research
reporting rules, IRB processes, and individual institution posture and infrastructure
capabilities to secure research funding.
The results from this study answer the previously unanswered question with
regard to AAMC institutional change with regard to COI issues. That is, while some of
the literature reports many institutions had adopted COI policies (Huddle, 2010; Rothman
& Chimonas, 2008), the extent to which these policy developments were consistent with
IOM policy recommendations is now established. Current institutional practice to restrict
industry representative access may have addressed research bias concerns presented by
previous work of Campbell et al. (2007) and Zinner et al. (2009). Previous researchers
only suggested that industry interactions could potentially create research bias and this
new era of access restriction potentially makes this a moot point. Maahs (2012) and
Steinbrook (2009) raised the issue of restrictive interaction and COI policies being
adopted by medical academia and research effectiveness and efficiency being called into
question. The findings (while somewhat limited) do not suggest that this phenomenon
had a correlation to research placement at the university level. McKinnon (2009) and
Kitsis (2011) presented thoughts around public and private partnerships being able to
fruitfully coexist through collaborative and transparent partnerships. Unfortunately, the
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findings suggest that medical academia has not embraced this entirely, as these themes
were highly absent during the research and analysis phase of this study.
The conceptual framework ACF (Birkland, 2001; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith,
1988) was used as these lens upon which to design, conduct, and evaluate the research in
this study. The findings are consistent with this approach in the presentation of opinions
presented by interviewees that were many times heuristic in nature as well as the
complexity and self-interest of the multiple parties involved with medical research. One
of the major tenets of this conceptual framework is grounded on the premise that policy
change typically takes a minimum of 10 years to implement and fully understand
(Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1988). This was demonstrated in the fact that the first major
calls for COI reform started in 2006 (Breenan et al., 2006), the IOM and AAMC release
of their policy recommendations was in 2009 (AAMC, 2009; Lo & Field, 2009), and the
final NIH Reporting Rule came into play in 2011 (NIH, 2011); during the research
timeframe (2014-2015), institutions were still making adjustments in policy relative to
medical research funding.
Limitations of the Study
The study findings with regard to COI policy development across United States
medical based schools being in compliance with the 2009 IOM Policy Report (Lo &
Field, 2009) were fairly robust in overall compliance rates of the 15 institutions’ policies
evaluated. These particular findings are somewhat limited to policy development as
policy effectiveness was not really studied. That is, a policy can sit on a shelf, but unless
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it is actually implemented, it is otherwise meaningless. The provisions of the NIH
Reporting Rule (2011) and the amount of NIH funding that medical schools receive,
however, could explain a high level of motivation to comply with managing COI policies
at an institutional level.
The findings concerning COI policy development and the effect on research
placement by the pharmaceutical industry is challenged and limited to the extent that it is
based off four interviews from administrators representing United States based 75
AAMC schools and may not apply across all institutions. Again, the overall
nonengagement by academia to be involved with this study led to the number of
interviews being reduced by just over half.
Recommendations
When looking at the entire body of literature with regard to COI issues in
academia and the results from this study, a number of recommendations for further
research can be made. First, replicating the interview portion of this study with additional
topics added and administrated by the AAMC would be interesting. The nonengagement
from academia to be involved in this study is not entirely known, and, therefore,
conducting near replicated research through this particular association may produce
higher levels of participation and provide more data rich information to analyze.
Additional topics added within this study would include but not be limited to NIH
reporting requirements, IRB processes, research contracting, and direct engagement
and/or nonengagement with industry.
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The implementation of the reporting requirements with regard to the PPSA of
2010 (Sunshine Act) only started to come online during the second half of 2014.
Physician and institutional behavior with regard to having all transfers of money reported
and available online may or may not have a compounding effect on interactions with
industry moving forward and could be studied separately but should be examined as an
additional variable for future COI studies. The Sunshine Act was mentioned several times
during the interviews, but only in passing since interviewees saw no immediate impact to
their institutions during the research timeline studied. Moving forward, incorporating this
piece of legislation as a study variable should be considered.
The overall engagement and nonengagement between industry and academia
should be examined further. McKinnon (2009) developed concepts around the future of
public private partnerships and Kitsis (2011) called for a more collaborative approach to
the entire concept with regard to COI issues. A qualitative study to more fully examine
engagement and nonengagement between industry and academia is proposed as the
results from this study suggest that a collaborative platform has not moved forward.
Implications
Positive Social Change
The capacity for medical academia and industry to produce life-saving and lifeprolonging medications has important opportunities as well as profound responsibilities
attached to it. Proper attempts to reduce potential conflicts of interest in medicine have
largely addressed this responsibility. Unfortunately, the research presented here suggests
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that some administrative and reporting requirements have stifled the efficiency of this
platform. This relationship is further challenged by a nonengagement posture taken by
academia. The research conducted here points for the need for medical academia to arrive
at a philosophical spot where conflicts of interest in medicine are managed appropriately,
but industry interactions are still possible for the benefit of treating patients and
advancing medicine.
Recommendations for Practice
The findings from this study do not suggest that COI policies should be
eliminated and the previous way in which academia and industry engage return. Rather,
the current transparency requirements are good for all parties involved in that it
establishes a more visible and purposed way in which these entities should interact. It is,
however, concerning how nonengaged academia is with industry, unless research funding
(and a financial benefit for the institution) is involved. When industry has limited
opportunities to interact with academia, the ability to understand faculty expertise is
limited. Additionally, industry representatives being able to provide valuable information
and resources for the benefit of patients is diminished. Overall, this impacts the larger
continuum of improving patient health. The following recommendations are provided to
academia and industry:
1. Research placement is a competitive and time bound event. The FDA is
requiring larger sample sizes in research, more diligent safety reporting, and
longer duration of clinical trials. Given this, industry will engage with
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academia or contract research organizations that have existing positive
relationships, efficient contracting platforms, and a proven ability to conduct
the research in a timely matter.
2. Perceived institutional expertise is not a precursor to research placement. As
academia has distanced itself from industry, the ability to fully understand
faculty and institutional expertise is becoming more unknown, and the
opportunity to place research on this basis is diminishing. Institutions that can
compliantly and transparently engage with industry for partnerships will be
better equipped to leverage the expertise and talents of their faculty
accordingly.
3. Industry needs to do a better job of articulating what it trying to accomplish,
what it needs, and what it is looking for from the medical academic
community. Part of the disconnect between industry and academia appears to
be due to industry not being able to adequately articulate where it can be of
value to medical academic institutions and the benefit to patients accordingly.
4. For the benefit of a more efficient research platform, academia needs to adjust
to current changes in medicine, in research processes, and in disclosure
requirements. Institutions that want to be competitive for securing industry
research need to be prepared to make a number of infrastructure and processes
changes. Efficiencies in NIH reporting requirements, more productive IRB
processes, and investments in infrastructure are recommended.
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Potential COI in Medical Academia
As some COI authors have argued (Breenan et al., 2006), any contact with industry
creates an inherent COI. Institutions that believe this issue to be the case should be
prepared to disengage with all research with industry. On the contrary, institutions that
only engage with industry if research funding is involved have created their own COI
issue. That is, the financial reward for research appears to trump any other meaningful
engagement with industry. The reality of this dilemma should be reconciled to the
middle. Medical academic institutions that engage with industry across a variety of
platforms for the benefit of patient care, conduct well-controlled medical research, and do
so in an open and transparent fashion appear more purposed than their counterparts that
appear to only be motivated by research placement and the financial rewards of
conducting that research.
Conclusion
The ability for an effective and efficient research platform for the testing and
development of new medicines has historically depended on a productive partnership
between academia and industry. COI policy development, while highly justified, appears
to have helped produce a nonengaged relationship between these two entities. Institutions
that can efficiently navigate NIH reporting requirements, streamline IRB processes, and
more competitively posture themselves for research would seemed poised secure higher
levels of research funding. The next iteration of COI in medicine concerns medical
academic institutions’ ability reconcile their approach in dealing with industry from
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noninteractive to something that is closer to transparent and collaborative in nature.
Research placement has become more competitive and the pharmaceutical industry has
the option placing research with academia or contract research organizations. Given the
historical successes of the previous partnership between industry and academia, medical
academic centers that actively engage and collaborate with industry and are able to do so
in an efficient and transparent manner would be poised to leverage their expertise and
help advance new medication therapies for the benefit of humankind.
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Appendix A: Full Disclosure of Financial Interest
I have a significant financial interest and affiliation with the following company
discussed in this dissertation:
Pfizer - Full time employment from July 2003 to current (April, 2015) as Therapeutic
Specialty Representative. Standard educational assistance employee benefit of no
more than $10,000 tuition reimbursement per year for continuing education.
Pfizer - 401(k) – Fully vested in retirement plan with no more than 20% of portfolio held
as Pfizer stock and total account value of no more than $ 120,000
Pfizer Stock – Individual stock holdings of no more than $ 20,000
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Appendix B: Email Letter to Medical Director of Academic Institution
To: Contact Name
From:
Subject: (First Request) - Research Survey – Request for Information
Walden IRB Approval Number: 02-24-14-0168299; Expiration: 02-25-2015
Dear Contact Name:
My name is Michael Maahs and I am a doctoral candidate at Walden University. I am
conducting qualitative dissertation research on interaction and conflict of interest policies
adopted by medical academic institutions and the potential effect on research funding
placement by the pharmaceutical industry. Recent research funding reports indicate a
slowdown of research placement at United States based medical academic institutions by
the pharmaceutical industry during the last five to seven years. It has also been observed
that many institutions have newly adopted or revised their previous interaction and
conflict of interest policies with regard to contact and involvement with the
pharmaceutical industry since the release of the 2009 Institution of Medicine’s Report on
Conflict of Interest. It is not known, however, if there is a relationship of policy
development and the effect on research funding levels at the individual institution level.
This qualitatively based research intends to examine the extent to which current conflict
of interest policy development would be consistent with the recommendations provided
in the 2009 IOM Report and the potential effect on research placement by the
pharmaceutical industry. The 75 largest medical academic institutions that are engaged in
medical research and are members of the American Association of Medical Colleges
have been initially selected for study inclusion.
It is appropriate that I disclose that I work for Pfizer. This dissertation research is
independent from my professional role at my company as I have no assigned
responsibilities that deal with or interact with medical academic centers. This research
project is my individual work and Pfizer has not provided research design assistance,
writing, or editing. Furthermore, the outcomes from this dissertation have no bearing on
my current career or job security with Pfizer.
Your time is important and I have kept the nature and depth of this initial survey as short
and straightforward as possible. Information provided by you will be treated as
confidential information: all results will be reported in aggregate.
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The second data collection component to this study includes an interview to clarify and
expand on initial information provided during the survey for those medical directors that
are interested in being interviewed. For the purposes of scientific validity and for the
betterment of medicine and society, please consider and indicate your interest in being
involved in this portion of research project. Your assistance to help make this research as
pertinent and accurate as possible is greatly appreciated.
Again, your assistance is greatly appreciated to better understand the slowdown of
pharmaceutical research placement at United States based medical academic centers. If
interested, institutions that volunteer to participate in this survey and interview will be
provided the overall results from this study.
If you have any questions about this research, please contact me via phone at or email at.
Again, thank you in advance for your assistance in allowing me to complete this research.
Please fill out the attached survey and return via email.
Sincerely:

Michael K. Maahs
Doctoral Candidate, Public Policy and Administration – Health Services
Walden University
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Appendix C: Online Survey
Medical Director Informed Consent and Survey on Interaction and Conflict of
Interest Policies with Regard to Contact with the Pharmaceutical Industry
Informed Consent: You are invited to take part in a research study on conflict of interest
policies adopted by medical academic institutions and the potential impact on research
funding by the pharmaceutical industry. Participating in this survey is voluntary. The
researcher is inviting medical directors from medical academic institutions to participate
in this survey. This portion of the survey is part of a process called “informed consent” to
allow you to understand this survey before deciding whether to participate. This study is
being conducted by a researcher named Michael K. Maahs, who is a doctoral student at
Walden University. Any questions or concerns about this study can be addressed to the
researcher via email at or by telephone at. If you want to talk privately about your rights
as a survey participant, you can call Dr. Leilani Endicott. She is the Walden University
representative who can discuss this with you. Her phone number is 1-800-925-3368,
extension 3121210, or email at irb@waldenu.edu. Walden University’s approval number
for this study is 02-24-14-016899 and it expires on 02-25-2015.
Purpose: To collect information about medical academic institution interaction and
conflict of interest policies and the potential effect on research funding placement by the
pharmaceutical industry from 2007 to current (2014)
Directions: Please answer each question as fully as possible. If particular information is
currently available via institution website, please cut and paste the information
accordingly. Any combination of free text, WordPerfect, Excel, or Adobe PDF software
files are encouraged as the response media for this survey. Your responses and all
information provided will be treated as confidential information: all results will be
reported in aggregate. By volunteering to be a part of this survey, you can receive a copy
of the results of the study if interested. At the end of the survey, please indicate if you
would be willing to be a part of an interview to clarify survey responses and gather
further information. Please submit all survey materials via email to
Interaction and Conflict of Interest Policies: Please provide institution interaction
and/or conflict of interest policies pertaining to contact and dealings with the
pharmaceutical industry that were in effect during 2007 with ongoing updates through
current day (2014).
Research Funding Received by the Pharmaceutical Industry: Please report research
funding received (if any) by your institution from the pharmaceutical industry expressed
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in annual dollar amounts from 2007 through current day (2014). This information should
be limited to research based activities and not associated with events like conference
display fees, sponsorships, and/or advertising. Also, please report total research funding
received (if any) by all sources from 2007 through current day (2014).
Interview: Please indicate if you are willing to be interviewed for this research study.
The interview portion of this research is intended to take one hour and informed consent
paperwork for the interview to be recorded will be provided/required. A typed transcript
of the interview will be provided for your review and approval.
Interest In Interview Phase of Research: Yes____ No ____
Contact Information (only if yes):
Name:
Address:
Phone:
Email:
Copy of Final Research:
Individuals that provide data for this project can receive a final copy of the research if
interested. Interest in final copy: Yes____ No____
Survey Return: Please submit all survey information via email to. Thank you for taking
time to participate in this qualitative research study.
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Appendix D: Interview Questions
Interview Questions
Question 1: Tell me a little bit about your current position with your institution? What
was your function with your institution prior to 2009? Describe your involvement, if any,
with regard to interaction and conflict of interest policies with the pharmaceutical
industry during this timeframe? Post 2009 IOM Recommendations on Conflict of Interest
through today, what has your function been with your institution? Please describe your
involvement, if any, relative to interaction and conflict of interest policy development
with the pharmaceutical industry during this timeframe?
Question 2: How familiar are you with the IOM 2009 Conflict of Interest Policy
recommendations? What can you tell me about it? Do you think its creation was
justified? What have been some of the implications of this report? How well has your
institution implemented the recommended policies? With regard to current policy, what
are some of the most important concerns or issues addressed when developing interaction
and conflict of interest policies for your institution?
Question 3: How well does your institution’s current policy addresses the concerns or
issues described by the IOM Policy in 2009? Why?
Question 4: What changes has your institution made since the release of the IOM Policy
in 2009? Did they go far enough? Why or why not? What future changes in current
interaction and/or conflict of interest policy do you foresee for your institution? Please
explain why.
Question 5: Please describe the nature of the relationship of your institution's medical
research department with the pharmaceutical industry. Why do you think that is? What
are some of the positive aspects of working with the pharmaceutical industry? Why?
What are some of the negative aspects of working with the pharmaceutical industry?
Why?
Question 6: Where there any institutional changes as a result of the 2009 IOM Policy?
Where does the bulk of your research funding come from? How much of it is from the
pharmaceutical industry? How do you think any changes your institution has made to
interaction and conflict of interest policies have influenced funding from the
pharmaceutical industry? Please elaborate. Other than interaction and conflict of interest
policy development, did your institution have any circumstances that would have either
positively or negatively affect research placement by the pharmaceutical industry? If yes,
please identify and explain further.
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Question 7: How would you describe any state or federal legislation or policy
recommendation(s) that would have motivated your institution make any of the changes
mentioned in question six?
Question 8: How does your institution monitor and enforce issues pertaining to conflict
of interest? Generally speaking, how do you handle a conflict of interest issue when a
faculty member is involved?
Question 9: Anything else? Please provide any other pertinent information with regard to
interactions and conflict of interest policy and research funding placement that may not
have been already captured in this survey.
Interview Follow-up: Is it okay to contact you for follow-up to clarify or follow-up any
responses provided in this interview? A typed transcript of the interview will be provided
to you for review and approval.
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Appendix E: IRB Informed Consent Letter for Recording Interview
Consent Form for Recording Interview about
Conflict of Interest Policies Adopted by Medical Academic Institutions and the
Potential Impact on Research Funding by the Pharmaceutical Industry
You are invited to take part in a research study on conflict of interest policies adopted by
medical academic institutions and the potential impact on research funding by the
pharmaceutical industry. The researcher is inviting administrators with decision making
authority from institutions that perform medical research to be interviewed for the study.
This form is part of a process called “informed consent” to allow you to understand this
study before deciding whether to participate. This study is being conducted by a
researcher named Michael K. Maahs, who is a doctoral student at Walden University.
Background Information:
In 2009, the IOM Report on Conflict of Interest called for medical academic institutions
to adopt extensive conflict of interest policies with regard to healthcare professionals and
interactions with the pharmaceutical and medical device industry. The purpose of this
study is to examine the conflict of interest policies from 2007 to current (2014) adopted
by medical academic institutions and the potential impact on research funding by the
pharmaceutical industry.
Procedures:
If you agree to be in this study and corresponding interview, you will be asked to
participate in a recorded one hour telephone interview. After the first interview, a followup interview may be required to clarify or expand on some the answers provided in the
first interview. A typed transcript of the interview(s) will be provided to you for final
review and approval.
Here are some sample questions: How familiar are you with the IOM 2009 Conflict of
Interest Policy recommendations? What have been some of the implications of this
report? How well has your institution implemented the recommended policies? Please
describe the nature of the relationship of your institution's medical research department
with the pharmaceutical industry. Why do you think that is? What are some of the
positive aspects of working with the pharmaceutical industry? Why? What are some of
the negative aspects of working with the pharmaceutical industry? Why? Where does the
bulk of your research funding come from? How much of it is from the pharmaceutical
industry? How do you think any changes your institution has made to interaction and
conflict of interest policies have influenced funding from the pharmaceutical industry?
Please elaborate. Other than interaction and conflict of interest policy development, did
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your institution have any circumstances that would have either positively or negatively
affect research placement by the pharmaceutical industry?
Voluntary Nature of the Study:
The interview for this study is voluntary. Everyone will respect your decision of whether
or not you choose to be interviewed. If you decide to join the study, you can still change
your mind during or after the interview. You may elect to have the interview stopped at
any time and will have the option of final approval of your interview transcript.
Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study:
Being this type of study involves a commitment of your time and being asked to
adequately represent the opinions and decision making process of your institution. Being
in this study would not pose risk to your safety or wellbeing. The potential benefit to
being involved in this study would be to better inform the medical community of the
potential impact of conflict of interest policies on funded research by the pharmaceutical
industry into medical academic institutions. If you have a crisis or become involved in a
crisis during the interview, you can stop the interview at any time.
Payment:
This is a voluntary study and no form of payment or reimbursement in kind is provided or
implied.
Privacy:
Any information you provide will be treated as confidential information. The researcher
will not use your personal or institutional information for any purposes outside of scope
of this research project. Also, the researcher will not include your name or anything else
that could identify you or the institution you are representing. Interview recordings,
transcripts, notes, and work product will be kept on a password protected USB thumb
drive. Data will be kept for a period of at least 5 years, as required by the university.
Contacts and Questions:
You may ask any questions now or before the interview begins. If you have questions
later, you may contact the researcher via email at or phone at. If you want to talk
privately about your rights as a participant, you can call Dr. Leilani Endicott. She is the
Walden University representative who can discuss this with you. Her phone number is 1800-925-3368, extension 3121210, or via email at irb@waldenu.edu. Walden
University’s approval number for this study is 02-24-14-0168299 and it expires on 02-252015
Statement of Consent:
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I have read the above information and I feel I understand the study well enough to make a
decision about my involvement. By replying to this email letter of consent with the
words, “I consent”, I understand that I am agreeing to the terms described above.
Thank you for your time.

Michael K. Maahs
Doctoral Candidate, Public Policy and Administration – Health Services
Walden University
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Appendix F: IRB Introductory Letter
To: IRB@waldenu.edu
From:
Subject: IRB Application for Michael K. Maahs
Dear Walden IRB:
My name is Michael Maahs and I am a doctoral candidate at Walden University. I am
proposing qualitative dissertation research on interaction and conflict of interest policies
adopted by medical academic institutions and the potential effect on research funding
placement by the pharmaceutical industry. Recent research funding reports indicate a
slowdown of research placement at United States based medical academic institutions by
the pharmaceutical industry during the last five to seven years. It has also been observed
that many institutions have newly adopted or revised their previous interaction and
conflict of interest policies with regard to contact and involvement with the
pharmaceutical industry since the release of the 2009 Institution of Medicine’s Report on
Conflict of Interest.
It is not known if there is a relationship of policy development and the effect on research
funding levels at the individual institution level. This qualitatively based research intends
to examine the extent to which current conflict of interest policy development would be
consistent with the recommendations provided in the 2009 IOM Report and the potential
impact on research placement by the pharmaceutical industry. The 75 medical academic
institutions that are engaged in medical research and are members of the American
Association of Medical Colleges have been initially selected for study inclusion and will
be sent surveys in an attempt to gather this initial information.
The second data collection component of this study includes a voluntary institutional
interview to clarify and expand on initial information provided from the survey to further
understand the rationale and decision making process with regard to policy development
and institutional perception on research placement. It is desired to have 10 institutions
complete the interview phase of the research to then look for common and/or uncommon
themes, associations, and associations on this research topic.
The attached IRB Application provides information along the entire range of important
topics to include; further description of the research, potential risks and benefits, data
integrity and confidentiality, potential conflicts of interest, data collection tools,
description of the research participants, informed consent, checklists and electronic

147
signatures. I hope that you will find these items presented in good order and the entire
IRB approval process will move forward in an efficient manner.
If you have any questions about my research and the submitted IRB application, please
contact me via phone at. Again, thank you in advance for your assistance in allowing me
to complete this research.
Sincerely:

Michael K. Maahs
Doctoral Candidate, Public Policy and Administration – Health Services
Walden University
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Appendix G: Ethical Certificate
Certificate of Completion
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) Office of Extramural Research certifies that
Michael Maahs successfully completed the NIH Web-based training course “Protecting
Human Research Participants”.
Date of completion: 12/16/2009
Certification Number: 352593
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Appendix H: COI Policy Recommendation Coding Table
Instit. Policy Recommenation
1
2
3
101
y
n-m
y
102
y
n-m
y
103
y
n-m
y
104
y
n-m
y
105
y
n-m
n-$
106
y
n-m
y
107
y
n-m
y-txt
108
y
n-m
y
109
y
n-m
y
110
y
n-m
y
111
y
n-m
y
112
y
n-m
y
113
y
n-m
y
114
y
n-m
y-txt
115
y
n-m
y-txt

4
y
y
y
n-np
n-d
y
y
y
y
y
n
y
y
n
n

5
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y

6
y-cme
y
y-cme
y-cme
n-$
y-os
y-o/os
y
y-cme
y-cme
y-o/os
y
y-hol
y
y-cme

Key:
y - yes
y-ns, yes- no samples allowed at all
y-cme, yes-CME allowed though
y-os, ys-off site only if sponsored by industry
y-txt, yes, only textbooks allowed
y-hol, yes, holiday snacks allowed
y-o/os, yes-on-site, off-site only if sponosored by industry
n-d, no-discouraged but not prohibited
n-m, no-managed
n-np, no non-promotional speaking only
n-s, no-ACCME standards mentioned
n-$, no -$5.00 per event, $75.00 limit per year per company
u-unknown
n - no

7
y
y
y
n
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
Points
10
10
8
8
8
8
7
6
6
5
4
2
2
0

8
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
n-m
y
y
y

9
n
y-ns
y-ns
y-ns
u
y-ns
n
y-ns
n-m
y
u
n
y-ns
y-ns
y-ns

10
n-m
y
n-m
n
n-m
n-m
n-s
n-m
n-m
n
n
n-m
n-m
n
n
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Appendix I: Preset Codes to Themes Tree
Topic: Function with institution prior to 2009 IOM Policy Report and current
function with institution.
-Function:
--P1: Dean of Medical School and Vice President for Medical Affairs
--P2: Associate Dean for Regulatory Affairs
--P3, P5: Director, Conflict of Interest Office
-Time with Institution:
--P1,P5: 2005
--P2: 2006
--P3: 2009
Topic: Familiarity with 2009 IOM Policy Report, justification, and institutional
policy changes made.
-Familiarity with IOM Report:
--P1, P2,P3,P5: Familiar
--P1, P2: AAMC Guidelines larger impact on policy
--P3, P5: AAMC Guidelines also an impact
--P1: Part of AAMC report on COI
--P2: Member of IOM
-Justification:
--P1,P3: Traditional financial ties and need for change
--P1,P5: Public trust issues
--P3: Evidence to suggest free gifts creates COI issue
--P3: Speaker bureaus one faculty tripled their salary while still maintaining full salary
--P5: IOM right on target with recommendations
-Policy Changes Made
--P1, P2, P3, P5: Speaker bureaus
--P1: Greater transparency in research
--P3: Eliminated free meals
--P3: Eliminated gifts
--P3: Eliminated consulting
--P3: Representative allowed access with appointment
--P5: Representatives not allowed access
--P5: Changed policies but still have to update again
Topic: Institution’s current policy and how it addresses concerns from the 2009
IOM Policy report.
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-P1,P5: Transparency: Needed to make changes with regard to public trust
-P1: Adherence: 90% Alignment – tie back to policy review
-P1: Adherence: Terminated two faculty that continued to speak for industry
-P2: Adherence: Pretty well, changed culture – tie back to policy review
-P5: Adherence: Disclosure and management of COI issues is key
-P5: Adherence: We are doing largely what the IOM asked us to do
-P3: Restrictive policy and negative impact on research funding
Topic: Describe current relationship with pharmaceutical industry.
-P1, P5: Encourage faculty to do research with industry.
-P3: Improving after down turn
-P3: Highly reduced interactions with industry
-P5: Sales representatives just are allowed in anymore
-P3: Opportunities to interact and collaborate for research are restricted
Topic: Positive aspects of working with the pharmaceutical industry.
-P1,P2,P3: make important medical discoveries
-P1,P2: industry partner needed to bring new therapies to market
-P2: new medications available to some patients that are still being studied
Topic: Negative aspects of working with the pharmaceutical industry.
-P1: Research Bias, Attempt to suppress research outcomes (2x)
-P2: Industry having too much a vested interest in research outcomes
-P3: Personal example of uneasy feeling at Advisory Board
-P5: Perception issues of being bought for research results
Topic: Medical research funding sources and how much of it is from the
pharmaceutical industry.
-P1: $150 million a year NIH, $ 30 million year from industry, around 20%
-P2: $ 500 million a year total, $ 300 million NIH, range of $ 50-100 million from
industry, around 10-20% from industry, but not entirely sure
-P3, P5: less than 10 % from industry
Topic: Changes in COI policy and impact on pharmaceutical funding placement.
-P1, P2,P5: Not really
-P3: Our COI Policies in conjunction with NIH led to downturn in research
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-P2,P3,P5: NIH Rule
-P2: IRB approval process
-P2: Industry support is better reimbursed than NIH funding
-P5: NIH support dwindling creates financial issues for institutions
Topic: Other changes within institution and impact on pharmaceutical funding
placement.
-P1: Research funding gone up as result of infrastructure, faculty, and efficiency
investments
-P1: Research funding up as result of streamlined IRB process
Topic: State or federal legislation that has impacted COI policy.
-P1: Sunshine Act as motivator to change COI policy
-P2, P3: Sunshine Act as item of awareness
-P5: Sunshine Act has got10 a lot of at10tion, don’t know real impact
Topic: COI Enforcement
-P1, P3: Monitoring tools
-P1, P2, P3: COI Committee
-P2, P5: COI Education
-P5, P2: COI Review Process
-P2, P5: Trust Model
-P2,P3,P5: COI Disclosures
-P1: Terminated to two faculty that continued to speak for industry
-P1, P2: Broad implications across all forms of funding, foundations, sponsors,
government
-P2, P3: COI issues more complex
-P3: COI issues and “retail based” cash paid therapies
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Appendix J: Emergent Codes to Themes Tree
Topic: Negative Perception of Pharmaceutical Industry
-P1: Industry research suppression (2x)
-P5: Medical students didn’t want to be tainted by industry
-P3: Consulting, negative experience of input for marketing
-P1,P2,P3: Financial ties from speaking creating COI issues
-P2: Faculty more cautious when speaking to industry
Topic: Positive Perception of Pharmaceutical Industry
-P1: Industry has done reasonable job of repairing image from past
Topic: Role of Academia in Pharmaceutical Research
-P1, P2, P3: Expertise
-P1, P2: Industry is vehicle to get medicine to market
-P1: Phase I and II trials
-P2: Phase I, II, and III trials
-P3: Partner for investigator initiated research
Topic: Speaker Bureaus
-P1,P2,P3: Financial ties from speaking bureau creating COI issues
-P1,P2, P3: Removing faculty from appearance as “industry spokesperson”
-P1: Two faculty terminated for participation in speaker bureau
-P1: Faculty making over $100k per year in speaker bureau
-P3: Faculty speaking for 10 companies and tripling academic salary
Topic: Institution and Individual Cultural Shift with Regard to Industry Contact
P1: Shift in practice about speaker bureaus
P2: Faculty sensitized about contact with industry and COI issues
P2,P5: Culture changes about individual behavior
P2,P3: Faculty proactive on disclosure/approval with regard to COI issues
P5: Faculty engaged in what IOM wants us to be doing with regard to COI issues
P5: Medical student not wanting to be tainted by industry
Topic: Better Research
-P1: Better designed research, larger clinical trials, better safety monitoring
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-P3: Collaborate with industry to conduct investigator initiated research
Topic: Collaboration
-P5: Industry and academic partnerships are a positive thing if managed correctly
Topic: NIH Reporting Rules and Impact on Research Funding
-P2: Review all applications going to public health funding for compliance
-P2,P3: NIH rule required investment for disclosure, management, and reporting
-P3, P2: NIH rule more dramatically impacted funding by industry than COI policy
-P4: NIH rule impacted process for research as whole
Topic: Institutional Challenges with IRB Efficiency
P1: Streamline IRB process
P2: Industry not impressed by length of time IRB process
P3: Making attempt to streamline IRB process

